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RIGHT OF RETURN: LEE V. CITY OF CHICAGO AND
CONTINUING SEIZURE IN THE PROPERTY CONTEXT
INTRODUCTION
You are heading home from a Chicago Bulls game at the United
Center when, as you pulled out of the parking lot onto Wood Street,
you hear two loud cracks, screaming, and your rear window shatter-
ing. You have just witnessed an attempted murder and, unfortunately,
you and your car happened to be right in the middle of a drive-by
shooting that you had nothing to do with. You wait with your car
while the police question you and eventually tell you they are going to
take your car as evidence of the crime. Of course you acquiesce-it is
your duty to assist the police in finding and prosecuting this lawless
criminal. A month later you get a letter notifying you that the police
no longer need your car for evidentiary purposes, and that you are
free to pick it up whenever you want-so long as you pay the towing
fees and a month's worth of storage fees. What is more, the letter
informs you that if you cannot come up with this money within thirty
days, your vehicle will be sold at auction or destroyed.1
Up until this point you have played the role of model citizen and
have surrendered your car so that police may use it as evidence in
prosecuting a dangerous criminal. But now that the government no
longer has any use for your car, is it fair that you should pay to get it
back? Would your answer be the same if the police pinned you as a
suspect, arrested you and took your car, but later realized they were
wrong and dropped the charges? What if there was no fee to get your
car back, but in order to reclaim it you had to find the officer who
took your car, had to ask him to fill out some paperwork, and then
had to wait another month for the government to process your
claim-is that a reasonable policy? Just what are your rights with re-
spect to reclaiming property voluntarily given up for use as evidence?
The above situations are all examples of how the government can
legally seize property and keep it (or condition its return upon pay-
ment of fees) after the initial justification for the seizure-the prop-
erty's evidentiary value-has expired. If the intention behind such
continued retention of private property is an attempt to make it so
difficult to get the property back that it amounts to a de facto taking-
1. This fact pattern is similar to the facts in Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456 (7th Cir.
2003).
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a disguised attempt to convert private property-a court should have
no trouble invalidating such a policy.2 In some instances, however,
the government may only be acting unreasonably, given the fact that it
has no further use for the property. Citizens in the latter case, espe-
cially innocent bystanders, are equally deserving of recourse when
government takes their property, initially with probable cause, but
then refuses its return even when that cause no longer exists.
When state or local governments infringe on our rights, we usually
turn to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for relief.3 Under that statute, one states a
claim for relief when the government has violated a constitutional
right under "color of law."'4 But what constitutional right has the gov-
ernment violated when it takes your property and keeps it even after
the government has no use for the property? Has the government
unjustifiably interfered with an individual's property rights without
due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?
Has the government taken property without just compensation under
the Fifth Amendment? Has the government made an unreasonable
seizure under the Fourth Amendment?
Some courts reject this last notion because they view a Fourth
Amendment seizure as an instantaneous event. From this perspective,
the Fourth Amendment only protects a person's property interest at
the moment the property is taken from him or her. The Seventh Cir-
cuit recently applied this approach in Lee v. City of Chicago.5 Judge
Diane P. Wood, however, in a concurring opinion, was not so quick to
hold the Fourth Amendment "utterly irrelevant to the reasonableness
of a decision to refuse to relinquish seized property once the govern-
ment has no need for it."'6
This Note discusses the feasibility and desirability of interpreting
Fourth Amendment protections as extending past the actual moment
the government takes one's property. Part II outlines the background
of the concept of "continuing seizure" as it developed in the context
of excessive force cases.7 Part III then reviews the theory's brief treat-
ment in the property context, focusing on the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion in Lee.8 Part IV examines whether the text of the Fourth
2. See United States v. Premises Known as 608 Taylor Ave., 584 F.2d 1297, 1302 (3d Cir. 1978)
(discussing various constitutional limitations on government's power to seize property and keep
it indefinitely).
3. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
5. 330 F.3d 456.
6. Id. at 472 (Wood, J., concurring).
7. See infra notes 22-111 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 112-143 and accompanying text.
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Amendment supports the notion of continuing seizure, and whether
application of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard in
return of property cases is practical and wise.9 This section then sets
out how a Fourth Amendment analysis might look in the return of
property context, pointing out that the need to balance law enforce-
ment interests with individuals' property interests is what makes appli-
cation of the Fourth Amendment appropriate in these cases.' 0 Part V
addresses the possible ramifications of holding the Fourth Amend-
ment "irrelevant" to government conduct concerning the return of
private property used as evidence.11 Specifically, Part V speaks to the
inadequacy of due process protections in this context, 2 and addresses
the possible rislks of relying on a successful takings claim.13 Ulti-
mately, this Note concludes that the continuing seizure approach is
supported by the text of the Constitution, and is the most practical
approach to, and affords the most protection against, unwarranted
government retention of property. 14
II. BACKGROUND: How COURTS HAVE DEALT WITH THE
QUESTION OF WHEN SEIZURE ENDS
The federal courts first addressed the question of when a Fourth
Amendment seizure ends in the excessive force context.1 5 The issue
there was whether force applied after the actual arrest should be eval-
uated under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard or
under the principles of due process.1 6 The federal courts are split on
the issue, with some recognizing that seizure can continue past arrest
and others holding that Fourth Amendment protections end after the
moment of arrest.1 7 Most courts extend the Fourth Amendment up to
the determination of probable cause.18
The few courts that have addressed the issue of when seizure ends
in the property context, however, have held that the Fourth Amend-
ment is irrelevant after the initial taking of the property.1 9 The most
9. See infra notes 148-237 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 238-258 and accompanying text. The Lee court's rejection of the Fourth
Amendment in favor of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is
discussed in notes 259-263 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 264-307 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 264-287 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 288-307 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 308-309 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 31-71 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 31-71 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 31-71 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 31-71 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 88-111 and accompanying text.
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recent case adopting this approach is Lee, where the Seventh Circuit
broadly held that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard
does not control government conduct with respect to the return of
personal property.20
A. History of the Continuing Seizure Doctrine
Courts first discovered the need to determine the temporal scope of
the Fourth Amendment in cases where police used unreasonable force
shortly after arrest. The federal circuits are split on the issue of how
long a seizure continues after the initial act of arrest in this context. 2'
1. The Temporal Quality of Fourth Amendment Seizures
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from "unreasonable
searches and seizures. ' 22  The Fourth Amendment is "commonly
thought of as a limitation on the power of police to search for and
seize evidence, instrumentalities, and fruits of crime. '2 3 The police
can violate the Fourth Amendment by executing an illegal arrest or
other unreasonable seizure of a person,24 for which a victim can ob-
tain subsequent relief through a civil suit brought under § 1983.25 It
was regarding this latter intrusion-the unreasonable seizure of a per-
son in the context of postarrest excessive force claims-that the ques-
tion of how long a seizure actually occurs was first the subject of some
controversy. 26
In the postarrest excessive force context, the issue is not whether a
seizure has occurred, since the suspect is already in custody, but
20. See infra notes 112-135 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 31-84 and accompanying text.
22. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
23. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.1 (4th ed. Supp. 2004).
24. Id.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
Pursuant to this statute, damages may be brought in a federal court against municipal and
state officers by a plaintiff who sufficiently alleges a violation of his constitutional rights. See
LAFAVE, supra note 23, § 1.10 ("[T]he fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures has been a popular vehicle for section 1983 claims," and "actions have
been undertaken with some frequency for illegal arrests,..., illegal seizures of property,.., and
accompanying use of unreasonable force.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. See infra notes 31-84 and accompanying text.
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"whether the seizure is still taking place at the time the force is ex-
erted. ' 27 If the suspect is still being "seized" when the officer applies
the force, the officer's conduct can be evaluated under the Fourth
Amendment standard of reasonableness. 28 If "the seizure has ended,
however, the Fourth Amendment will be inapplicable. ' 29 Thus, the
temporal scope of seizure under the Fourth Amendment is critical in
this context. 30
2. The Concept of Continuing Seizure as Developed Through
Excessive Force Claims in the Federal Circuits
The United States Supreme Court has refused to address the ques-
tion of how long after the point of arrest the Fourth Amendment con-
tinues to provide protection against excessive force-and has thus not
explained when a seizure actually ends. 3' This has led some courts
adjudicating excessive force claims to hold that a seizure continues be-
yond arrest to some point farther down the custodial process.32 The
effect of this reasoning is that the government must conduct itself in a
reasonable manner past the moment of initial seizure, or the "continu-
ing seizure" violates the Fourth Amendment.
27. Eamonn O'Hagan, Note, Judicial Illumination of the Constitutional "Twilight Zone": Pro-
tecting Post-Arrest, Pretrial Suspects from Excessive Force at the Hands of Law Enforcement, 44
B.C. L. REV. 1357, 1363 (2003).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. For example, if the Fourth Amendment only controls until a suspect is handcuffed and
restrained, it probably has nothing to say about how much force a police officer uses in putting
the suspect into the police car.
31. See O'Hagan, supra note 27, at 1367-68 (discussing the implications of Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386 (1989), in which the Supreme Court left open the question of whether the Fourth
Amendment provides protection against the use of excessive force beyond the point at which
arrest ends and pretrial detention begins). In Graham, the Supreme Court determined that the
Fourteenth Amendment's "Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of ex-
cessive force that amounts to punishment." Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. Thus, the critical issue is
whether the Fourth Amendment continues to provide protection to persons "who have been
arrested but have yet to make their first judicial appearance." Erica Haber, Note, Demystifying
a Legal Twilight Zone: Resolving the Circuit Court Split on When Seizure Ends and Pretrial De-
tention Begins in § 1983 Excessive Force Cases, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. 939, 947 (2003). The
question of when seizure ends is even more confusing in the property context, because there
typically is no "first judicial appearance" for seized property.
32. Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that "once a seizure has
occurred, it continues throughout the time the arrestee is in custody of the arresting officers");
see also Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding that "the seizure that occurs
when a person is arrested continues [throughout the time] the person remains in the custody of
the arresting officers") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Powell v. Gardner, 891
F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) (indicating that "the Fourth Amendment standard probably
should be applied at least to the period prior to the time when the person arrested is arraigned
or formally charged").
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The Ninth Circuit was the first federal circuit to hold the govern-
ment to this standard in an excessive force case. In Robins v.
Harum,33 the Ninth Circuit held that "excessive use of force by a law
enforcement officer in the course of transporting an arrestee gives rise
to a section 1983 claim based upon a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. '' 34 Police had arrested the plaintiffs in Robins for littering and
obstructing traffic and had placed them in the rear of a patrol car. 35
The Robinses' excessive force claim derived from a struggle with their
arresting officers "en route" to jail.36 In affirming the district court's
finding for the plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit conceded that the excessive
force in the case was applied subsequent to the Robinses' arrest, but
concluded that "once a seizure has occurred, it continues throughout
the time the arrestee is in the custody of the arresting officers. '37 Be-
cause the arrests in Robins "plainly constituted seizures for Fourth
Amendment purposes" and "[t]hese seizures continued while the
Robinses were en route to the sheriff's department in the custody of
the arresting officers," the officers' conduct should be evaluated under
the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement. 38 In a more
recent case,39 the Ninth Circuit confirmed that a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment is not confined to the initial moment of arrest-
that "acts of continuing dominion upon already seized suspects [are]
... enough to implicate the Fourth Amendment. '40
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits also adopted the continuing seizure
approach, applying the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard
in cases where excessive force is used while a person is still in the
custody of the arresting officers. 41 Both circuits extended Fourth
Amendment protection through the booking process.42 The Sixth Cir-
33. See generally Robins, 773 F.2d at 1004.
34. Id. at 1010.
35. Id. at 1006.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1010 (emphasis added).
38. Id.
39. Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2001).
40. Id. at 879.
41. See Mayard v. Hopwood, 105 F.3d 1226, 1228 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying the Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness standard to analyze a claim of excessive force where plaintiff was in the
back seat of a police car en route to police headquarters); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302,
1306 (6th Cir. 1988) (explaining that "the seizure that occurs when a person is arrested continues
throughout the time the person remains in the custody of the arresting officers").
42. See Phelps v. Coy. 286 F.3d 295. 300 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard is proper during booking where arrestee is still in the custody of the
arresting officers); Moore v. Novak, 146 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying the Fourth
Amendment objective reasonableness standard to excessive force claim arising from a struggle
and the use of a stun gun during the booking process).
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cuit, in Phelps v. Coy, emphasized that "the reasonableness standard
governs throughout the seizure of a person, ' 43 and that "creating a
different Fourth Amendment standard applicable to the use of force
in a post-arrest situation than is applicable to pre-arrest conduct
[would introduce] a distinction in meaning of the Fourth Amendment
that is found nowhere in its language. ' 44 Crucial to the court's reason-
ing in Phelps was the fact that the plaintiff was still in his arresting
officer's custody when force was applied.45 Although the Eighth Cir-
cuit is decidedly (and perhaps intentionally) unclear about what drives
the determination of when a seizure ends, it may also have found sig-
nificant the fact that the plaintiff was still in the arresting officer's cus-
tody when force was applied in Wilson v. Spain.46 In that case, the
court applied the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard to an
altercation between the plaintiff and the arresting officer. 47 The alter-
cation occurred after arrest and after booking, while the plaintiff was
being detained in a holding cell.48 Thus, in the Sixth and Eighth Cir-
cuits, the temporal scope of the Fourth Amendment appears to be
defined by the arresting officer's presence or control over the arrestee,
rather than by the actual event of arrest.
The Second and Tenth Circuits continue to apply Fourth Amend-
ment protections beyond the point of initial seizure in the excessive
force context, but seem to focus more on the determination of proba-
ble cause as the relevant temporal guideline that signals when seizure
ends. For instance, the Second Circuit, in Powell v. Gardner,49 held
that the Fourth Amendment continues to protect an arrestee from ex-
cessive force while he is being detained at the police station.50 In so
holding, the Powell court submitted that "the Fourth Amendment
standard probably should be applied at least to the period prior to the
time when the person arrested is arraigned or formally charged, and
43. Phelps, 286 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added).
44. Id. (quoting Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 241 (6th Cir. 1996)) (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
45. See id. ("Whatever arguments can be made about [whether the Fourth Amendment ap-
plies to] pretrial detainees' rights are beside the point in this case, in which the plaintiff was still
in the custody of the arresting officers and was never incarcerated .... [Olur precedent estab-
lishes that an arrestee in the custody of the arresting officers is still sheltered by the Fourth
Amendment.").
46. See Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715-17 (8th Cir. 2000) (reviewing precedent and elect-
ing to apply the Fourth Amendment to analyze plaintiff's claim of excessive force arising from
arresting officer knocking plaintiff unconscious by opening his cell door).
47. Id. at 716.
48. Id. at 714.
49. 891 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1989).
50. Id. at 1044.
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remains in the custody (sole or joint) of the arresting officer."'51 Simi-
larly, in Austin v. Hamilton,52 the Tenth Circuit held that the "fourth
amendment's strictures continue in effect to set the applicable consti-
tutional limitations... on the treatment of the arrestee detained with-
out a warrant. ' 53 The Austin court found this conclusion controlling
where the plaintiffs alleged that they were repeatedly beaten and de-
nied use of a bathroom while being detained for more than twelve
hours, "because the incidents alleged occurred prior to any probable
cause hearing" and "[i]n fact, [the] plaintiffs were never formally
charged by defendants or brought before a judicial officer. ' 54 Thus,
an initial judicial determination of probable cause appears to dictate
the temporal scope of the Fourth Amendment in the Second and
Tenth Circuits.
The notion that seizure can continue, and with it Fourth Amend-
ment protections, past the initial act of seizure received some recogni-
tion by the Supreme Court in Albright v. Oliver.55 In Albright, the
plaintiff had turned himself in after learning of an outstanding warrant
for his arrest for the sale of a substance which looked like an illegal
drug.56 Plaintiff's arresting officer testified at a preliminary hearing
that the plaintiff sold the look-alike drug to a third party, and that
court found probable cause to detain him for trial.57 Later, however,
that court dismissed the action because "the charge did not state an
offense under [state] law."58 Subsequently, the plaintiff filed suit
under § 1983, alleging that the officer had transgressed the plaintiff's
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights by depriving
him of his liberty interest to be free from criminal prosecution without
probable cause. 59 Thus, the time in question in Albright was after the
initial seizure but before trial, when the plaintiff was essentially a pre-
trial detainee. 60 A plurality of the Court held that the Fourth Amend-
ment was the applicable constitutional framework for this period.61
51. Id. It is unclear whether the Fourth Amendment protects the arrestee from the conduct of
a nonarresting officer prior to arraignment. If it does not, then the determinative question, as it
is in Sixth and Eighth Circuits, may be whether the arrestee is still in the custody of the arresting
officer.
52. 945 F.2d 1155 (10th Cir. 1991), abrogated by Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995).
53. Id. at 1160.
54. Id.
55. 510 U.S. 266 (1994).
56. Id. at 268.
57. Id. at 269.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 268-69.
61. Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 (holding that "it is the Fourth Amendment, and not substantive
due process, under which petitioner Albright's claim must be judged").
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Chief Justice Rehnquist posited: "The Framers considered the matter
of pretrial deprivations of liberty and drafted the Fourth Amendment
to address it. ' ' 62 Thus, the Supreme Court recognized that the protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment extends beyond the initial act of arrest
and into the period before trial. 63
In a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg adopted a more expansive
definition of seizure.64 Justice Ginsburg argued that "[alt common
law, an arrested person's seizure was deemed to continue even after
release from official custody. '65 According to this construction, a per-
son is considered seized even if he is released before trial, because he
is hardly freed from the state's control upon his release from a po-
lice officer's physical grip: He is required to appear in court at the
state's command. He is often subject ... to the condition that he
seek formal permission from the court (at significant expense)
before exercising what would otherwise be his unquestioned right to
travel outside the jurisdiction.66
Accordingly, a defendant is also seized throughout trial, since he is
still bound to appear.67 Such a person, Justice Ginsburg argued, "is
scarcely at liberty; he remains apprehended, arrested in his move-
ments, indeed 'seized' for trial, so long as he is bound to appear in
court and answer to the state's charges. '68 Justice Ginsburg opined
that this conception of continuing seizure "comports with common
sense and common understanding" 69 and "recognizes that the vitality
of the Fourth Amendment depends upon its constant observance by
police officers."' 70 While this conception of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection against unreasonable government seizures may or may not
make "sense" in the context of seizure of a person, this Note contends
that such an approach undoubtedly should be applied to unreasonable
seizures of property. 71
62. Id. at 274.
63. Tiffany Ritchie, Comment, A Legal Twilight Zone: From the Fourth to the Fourteenth
Amendment, What Constitutional Protection is Afforded a Pretrial Detainee?, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J.
613, 624 (2003).
64. Albright, 510 U.S. at 276-81 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 278.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 279.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 278.
70. Albright, 510 U.S. at 278-79 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
71. See discussion infra notes 144-263 and accompanying text.
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3. Other Circuits Refuse to Apply the Fourth Amendment After the
Initial Act of Seizure
In Wilkins v. May,72 the Seventh Circuit rejected the continuing
seizure approach and confined Fourth Amendment seizure to the ini-
tial act of seizing.73 Judge Richard A. Posner, writing for the court in
Wilkins, declined to extend Fourth Amendment protection to ar-
restees who had yet to be charged. 74 Wilkins involved a § 1983 action
brought by an arrestee who alleged that two FBI agents had violated
his constitutional rights by extracting a confession for bank robbery
from him at gunpoint.75 Wilkins, the plaintiff, had been arrested and
put in a cell but had not yet been charged when Agents May and Mc-
Daniel brought him into a separate interrogation room and allegedly
extracted his confession by holding a gun to his head.76 Posner re-
fused to analyze the agents' conduct under the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard because Wilkins "had already been seized"
when he was in the interrogation room.77 Posner opined: "A natural
although not inevitable interpretation of the word 'seizure' would
limit it to the initial act of seizing, with the result that subsequent
events would be deemed to have occurred after rather than during
seizure. ' 78 Because the Seventh Circuit viewed the word "seizure" as
describing a single act, and because practical considerations 79 per-
suaded the court that the Fourth Amendment was ill-suited to deter-
mine the limits of permissible postarrest, pre-charge government
conduct, the Seventh Circuit in Wilkins rejected the concept of contin-
uing seizure.80
72. 872 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1989).
73. Id. at 193.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 191-92.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 192.
78. Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 192-93.
79. These practical objections are analyzed in infra notes 215-237 and accompanying text.
80. Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 194. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits followed suit and similarly refused
to apply the Fourth Amendment in excessive force cases past the point of arrest. In Riley v.
Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159 (4th Cir. 1997), the Fourth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment does
not extend to the mistreatment of arrestees or pretrial detainees in custody. Id. at 1162. The
Riley court, analyzing Supreme Court precedent, found the defining nature of seizure, at least in
the context of arrest, to be a "single act, and not a continuous fact." Id. at 1163 (quoting Califor-
nia v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Valencia v.
Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440 (5th Cir. 1993), the Fifth Circuit did not specifically decide when seizure
ends but held that the Fourth Amendment was "not so capacious or elastic as to cover pretrial
detention," at least where the alleged misconduct happened three weeks after the initial arrest.
Id. at 1444. The Fifth Circuit found "weak textual support" for the extension of Fourth Amend-
ment protection against unreasonable seizures in the context of arrest, concluding that the
[Vol. 55:745
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Despite the strong language used in Wilkins confining seizure to the
moment of arrest,81 the Seventh Circuit later interpreted this holding
to extend Fourth Amendment protections until the determination of
probable cause.82 Whether police conduct that occurs after arrest but
before determination of probable cause is still the "initial act of seiz-
ing" and not a "subsequent event . . . [occurring] after rather than
during seizure" is questionable. 83 In any event, Judge Posner's
cramped but "natural" definition of seizure severely confines the tem-
poral scope of Fourth Amendment protections, especially in a context
where there is no determination of probable cause, as in the case with
seizures of property. The Seventh Circuit confirmed this inference in
Lee.
84
B. Continuing Seizure in the Property Context
The Fourth Amendment also protects individuals' property inter-
ests from unreasonable government intrusion, and because these in-
terests can be interfered with after an initial seizure of property, the
temporal quality of the Fourth Amendment is also important in the
property context.8 5 The Second and Sixth Circuits first addressed the
issue 86 before the Seventh Circuit defined the Amendment's scope
with respect to property in Lee.87
1. Does Government Violate the Fourth Amendment When It
Reasonably Seizes Property But Later Unlawfully Retains
That Property?
The Fourth Amendment not only protects against the unreasonable
seizure of the "person," but also establishes the "right of the people to
be secure in their. . . houses, papers, and effects." 88 Importantly, the
Amendment "seems primarily directed to the initial act of restraining an individual's liberty
.... " Id.
81. Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 192 ("[Wilkins] was seized when he was arrested.").
82. See Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that "based on
our conclusion [in Wilkins] that the Fourth Amendment did not apply between arrest and con-
viction on the fact that the 'seizure' of an arrestee ends after the Gerstein hearing."); see also
Wiley v. City of Chicago, 361 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2004) (emphasizing that "We have repeat-
edly rejected the 'continuing seizure' approach .... Instead, we have held that the scope of a
Fourth Amendment claim is limited up until the point of arraignment.") (internal citations
omitted).
83. Wilkins, 872 F. 2d at 192-93. Wilkins does not appear to have been overruled.
84. Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 2003).
85. See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 112-143 and accompanying text.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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United States Supreme Court held that "[a] 'seizure' of property...
occurs when 'there is some meaningful interference with an individ-
ual's possessory interest in that property.' "89 Government seizures of
property will often be reasonable, for instance, when it is necessary to
procure evidence for trial,90 or when the property is contraband and
subject to forfeiture.91 But "government should not, by virtue of its
authority to seize, effect de facto forfeitures of property by retaining
items indefinitely. ' 92 The D.C. Circuit in Wilson opined that "it is
fundamental to the integrity of the criminal justice process that prop-
erty involved in the proceeding, against which no Government claim
lies, be returned promptly to its rightful owner." 93 Moreover, as one
commentator explained, "it is not fanciful to suggest ... that the con-
tinuing custody of objects lawfully seized but later found not to be of
evidentiary value becomes, at some point, unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. ' 94 Thus, it is possible that government may rea-
sonably seize property, but later be in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment if it unreasonably refuses to return that property after it no
longer has any use for the property and the individual's possessory
interest remains intact.
But what is the remedy for such a situation? If seizure under the
Fourth Amendment is confined to the initial act of seizing, the Fourth
Amendment is inapplicable when government refuses to relinquish
property that was once lawfully seized but then unreasonably re-
tained. Thus, while it may seem like the Fourth Amendment proscrip-
tion against unreasonable seizures would be an ideal candidate under
which to bring a § 1983 action when property is taken and not prop-
erly returned, this is not the case in jurisdictions with a more limited
conception of the temporal scope of the Fourth Amendment.
89. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 113 (1984)).
90. See United States v. Premises Known as 608 Taylor Ave., 584 F.2d 1297, 1302 (3d Cir.
1978) (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)).
91. 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 304 (2000) ("Individuals have no property right in
contraband materials, so contraband materials will not be returned to them regardless of
whether the initial seizure of such materials was improper or whether any person connected with
the seizure was convicted of a crime.").
92. Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Premises Known as 608
Taylor Ave., 584 F.2d at 1302).
93. United States v. Wilson, 540 F.2d 1100, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that a district court
had the duty to return to defendant property seized during an investigation of drug charges
which when it was no longer needed as evidence). Id.
94. LAFAvE, supra note 23, § 1.5(e) (discussing, in the context of the exclusionary rule, the
possibility that a seizure can become unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment when
evidence is transferred to one jurisdiction even though it was once legally seized in the transfer-
ring jurisdiction).
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2. The Second and Sixth Circuits Reject the Continuing Seizure
Doctrine in the Property Context
Whether the government's "refusal to return once lawfully obtained
property can amount to an unreasonable seizure, or, alternatively,
transform a seizure from reasonable to unreasonable," was briefly
considered in the Second and Sixth Circuits before the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Lee sweepingly decided the issue. 95 Both of these courts held
that the Fourth Amendment provided no recourse where the govern-
ment held on to property after it no longer needed the property.96
In United States v. Jakobetz,97 the Second Circuit held that the use
of evidence lawfully acquired but retained in violation of a statute did
not constitute the kind of seizure "that deserves the special protec-
tions provided by the fourth amendment. '98 In Jakobetz, a criminal
case, the defendant argued that photographic evidence obtained by
the New York State police from an earlier, unrelated investigation
should have been excluded at trial because the photographs were not
returned to him, a violation of a New York statute.99 New York law
required that, upon dismissal of charges, a court must issue an order
directing the return of all photographs and other evidence belonging
to the former defendant.100 Jakobetz argued that because no such or-
der was issued, the State's continued possession of the evidence for
use at the later trial constituted an illegal seizure.101 The Second Cir-
cuit rejected this argument, finding "no authority to indicate that
Jakobetz's constitutional rights have been violated. 1 °1 2 Because the
State's only "error" was its failure to return Jakobetz's property, the
Second Circuit held the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable. 10 3
The Sixth Circuit similarly held that no seizure occurs when there is
an initial, "lawful seizure of" property followed by government refusal
to return it.104 Fox v. Van Oosterum involved a § 1983 suit brought by
a plaintiff alleging that county officials had violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by refusing to return his suspended driver's license
95. See Lee, 330 F.3d at 460.
96. See id. at 460-61.
97. 955 F.2d 786, 802 (2d Cir. 1992).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 802 (holding that "[t]he only error here was the failure of the
New York court to issue a timely order to return the photograph-an oversight that does not
offend the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures").
104. Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 351 (6th Cir. 1999).
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after he had paid off several outstanding traffic tickets that had caused
the initial suspension. 10 5 The police legally seized Fox's license while
investigating several car thefts but later refused to return the license
because Fox had two additional outstanding tickets, even though these
tickets had no impact on his driving privileges. 10 6 The Sixth Circuit
held that the government's refusal to return the license did not consti-
tute a seizure and, therefore, did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment. 0 7 In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that the
refusal to return the license "neither brought about an additional
seizure nor changed the character of the [original] seizure from [rea-
sonable to unreasonable] because the seizure was already complete
when the defendants refused to return the license."'10 8 The Sixth Cir-
cuit buttressed its reasoning by pointing out that the Supreme Court
has only defined seizure as a "meaningful interference with possessory
interests" in cases where the challenged government conduct involved
the initial act of "taking property away." 10 9 Therefore, the Fox court
concluded, "the Fourth Amendment protects an individual's interest
in retaining possession of property but not the interest in regaining
possession of property."110 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit adopted the
view that once the "act of taking the property is complete, the seizure
has ended and the Fourth Amendment no longer applies." 1 '
105. See id. at 345-47.
106. Id. at 345.
107. Id. at 349. The Sixth Circuit limited its holding to the situation where there was an initial,
lawful seizure of property followed by a refusal to return that property. Id. at 351. The Fox
Court explicitly did not address "whether the term 'seizure' in the Fourth Amendment has a
different temporal scope when a person rather than property is at issue" or whether the Fourth
Amendment is so limited when a person voluntarily gives property to the government and the
government later refuses to return it, as was the case in Lee. Id. The effect this uncertainty has
had with respect to the strength of the Fox court's argument is discussed in infra notes 112-143
and accompanying text.
108. Fox, 176 F.3d at 350. Judge Eric L. Clay dissented on this point, arguing that "[t]he
concept that a seizure of property may, just as seizures of individuals, begin as reasonable but
may then ripen into a seizure that violates the Fourth Amendment is not new to constitutional
jurisprudence." Id. at 355-57 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), for the proposition that an initial, lawful seizure of property
might, "with the passage of time and the expiration or diminution of government interests, be-
come unlawful").
109. Id. at 351 (majority opinion).
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. Id. The Sixth Circuit explained that its holding that no seizure had occurred was also
motivated by reluctance to require Fourth Amendment analysis in the return of property context
where there is already a "well-developed procedural due process analysis that provides the states
with the first chance to prevent possible constitutional wrongs." Id. at 352. The implications of
relying on procedural due process as an alternative is discussed in infra notes 267-287 and ac-
companying text.
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III. SUBJECT OPINION: Lee v. City of Chicago
A. The Seventh Circuit: Seizure Is "Complete" When the Owner Is
Dispossessed- The Fourth Amendment Is "Irrelevant" to
the Return of Property
In Lee v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the Fox
court that once property is taken, seizure is complete and the "govern-
ment's decision regarding how and when to return once lawfully ob-
tained property 'raises different issues, which the text, history, and
judicial interpretations of the Fourth Amendment do not illumi-
nate.' 1112 Mark Lee's car was struck by a stray bullet while driving on
a Chicago street. 113 Hoping to find evidence of the shooter's identity,
Chicago police seized and "impounded Lee's car to search for, re-
trieve, and analyze any bullets that might have become lodged in
it.''114 Ten days after the incident, the City of Chicago (City) informed
Lee that it no longer needed his car as evidence.1 15 The City sent Lee
a notice advising him that he could retrieve his car, 116 but that he was
responsible for all towing and storage fees unless he requested a hear-
ing.' 17 Further, the notice advised Lee that if he failed to pay or re-
quest a hearing within thirty days, the City could crush his car or sell it
at auction.1 18 "Lee wanted to retrieve his car as soon as possible" but
could not afford to pay the fees, so he retained a lawyer who helped
him negotiate the fees down to an acceptable amount.11 9 When Lee
went to retrieve his car, however, "he found that the City had spray-
painted large, bright red" inventory numbers on its hood and side
panels.12 0 The City refused to pay for the damage, offer Lee a dis-
count, or refund the money he had just paid the City to get his car
back. 121
Frustrated by the City's policy concerning the return of innocent
bystanders' property used for evidentiary purposes, Lee sued the City
of Chicago under § 1983, alleging a violation of his Fourth Amend-
112. Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Wilkins v. May, 872
F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1989)).
113. Id. at 458.
114. Id. at 458-59.
115. Id. at 459.
116. The notice was actually sent two days after the incident, before the City informed Lee
that it no longer had use for his car. Id.
117. Id.
118. Lee, 330 F.3d at 459.
119. Id.
120. Id. When Lee finally retrieved his car, it was thirty-one days after the impoundment, one
day after the City's deadline for retrieval. Id.
121. Id.
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ment 122 right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures.1 23 The
district court dismissed the suit, holding that Lee could not state "a
claim under either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment regarding
the City's practice of charging towing and storage fees."'' 24 On appeal,
the Seventh Circuit did not evaluate the district court's finding that
the City's demands for returning Lee's car were reasonable; 125 it held
that once an owner has been dispossessed of his property, the seizure
is complete, and therefore the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
standard is inapplicable to the return of the seized property. 26
In reaching its decision, the court rejected Lee's arguments that (1)
the City's refusal to return his car to him after it had concluded its
search (unless he paid the fees) constituted a second seizure which
was unreasonable; and, alternatively, that (2) the otherwise reasona-
ble seizure of his car became unreasonable when the City's interest in
the car as evidence expired but his possessory interest survived. 127
The Seventh Circuit expressed disagreement with the reasoning in
both Jakobetz and Fox, but determined that there were "other justifi-
cations ' 128 for reaching the same conclusion as those courts and "re-
strict[ing] Fourth Amendment seizures temporally.' 1 29
122. The Fourth Amendment applies to cities through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 460
n.1.
123. Lee, 330 F.3d at 459. Lee also alleged that the City had violated his Fourteenth Amend-
ment substantive due process rights because requiring him to "pay money for the vehicle's re-
lease when it was no longer required for such evidentiary or investigative purposes by the City is
totally arbitrary, unauthorized by statute or ordinance." Brief of Appellant at 4, Lee, 330 F.3d
456 (No. 02-1503), 2002 WL 32170366, at *7. Additionally, Lee brought pendant state-law claims
for implied bailment, trespass, and conversion. See Lee, 330 F.3d at 459. The court eventually
found that Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process was the proper principle under
which to bring Lee's claim. Id. at 466-67. Nonetheless it held that Lee could not recover under
substantive due process because his claim did not implicate a fundamental right, involving only
the deprivation of a property interest. Id. at 467. Moreover, Lee did not establish that state law
remedies were inadequate. Id. at 467-68. These requirements and the desirability of the due
process approach in general are discussed in infra notes 265-286 and accompanying text.
124. Lee, 330 F.3d at 459. The district court also held that Lee had no cognizable property
interest in his car at the time it was spray painted, and thus lacked standing to challenge the
spray painting. Id. The Seventh Circuit reversed this part of the district court's decision, holding
that although Lee's property interest in his car may have become "defeasible" after the thirtieth
day of impoundment, he still had some residual interest in reclaiming his property and that such
an interest did not expire until the car was either sold or destroyed. Id. at 470.
125. Lee v. City of Chicago, No. 01-C-6751, 2002 WL 169322, at *4 (N.D. II. 2002) (holding
that it is not unreasonable to expect Lee to assume some of the costs of a criminal investigation
in which everyone benefits, especially when he had the option of challenging the impoundment
at a hearing).
126. Lee, 330 F.3d at 466.
127. See id. at 460-66.
128. Id. at 462.
129. Id. at 463.
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First, the court argued that the text of the Fourth Amendment, spe-
cifically the words "to be secure," suggests a state of being that, once
disturbed by an act of dispossession, is extinguished. t30 The court but-
tressed this argument by citing to the Oxford English Dictionary,
which purportedly defined the meaning of seizure at the time of the
Fourth Amendment's drafting as: "a confiscation or forcible taking
possession (of land or goods); a sudden and forcible taking hold"-in
other words, a temporally limited act. 131 Second, the Seventh Circuit
pointed out that Wilkins required the court to reject the continuing
seizure approach and restrict Fourth Amendment seizures tempo-
rally. 132 The court found that the two practical objections to continu-
ing seizure both applied in Lee's case: (1) traditional considerations
used to give meaning to the word "reasonable" are unhelpful in
resolving cases after the initial act of seizure has occurred; and (2)
"allowing the analysis to proceed outside this traditional context,
under the amendment's general reasonableness requirement, would
lead to an 'unwarranted expansion of constitutional law."' 133 Accord-
ingly, because the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasona-
ble seizures is limited to the initial act of taking possession, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that Lee had no claim against the City and
its policy concerning the return of property it obtained lawfully but no
longer needed as evidence. 134 Such a claim "concerns the fairness and
integrity of the criminal-justice process, and does not seek to constrain
unlawful intrusions into the constitutionally protected areas of the
Fourth Amendment."'1 35
B. Judge Wood Refuses to Hold the Fourth Amendment
"Utterly Irrelevant"
Concurring in the judgment, Judge Wood ultimately agreed that
Lee should not prevail on his Fourth Amendment claim but was not
"so confident that the Fourth Amendment is utterly irrelevant to the
reasonableness of a decision to refuse to relinquish seized property
130. Id. at 462.
131. Id. (citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
132. Lee, 330 F.3d at 463.
133. Id. (quoting Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1989)). The court stated that
"[a]ttempting to extend the Fourth Amendment through Place or... consent cases to address
the situation before us would implicate the same practical concerns we found unsettling in Wil-
kins. Id. at 465.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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once the government has no need for it. '136 Judge Wood formulated
the question in Lee as "whether there is any recourse for an innocent
party like Lee when the government takes his property, initially for
law enforcement purposes, and then refuses to return it uncondition-
ally when the original raison d'etre of the seizure has expired."1 37 She
was not convinced that "simply saying that a seizure is a temporally
limited act . . . is enough to resolve the question." 138 Judge Wood
expressed concern that the majority's broad holding that the Fourth
Amendment "has nothing to say about a seizure beyond the instant
when that seizure occurs,"'1 39 risks "creating an unwarranted gap in
the constitutional protections that exist with respect to governmental
takings of property."' 40 In other words, according to Judge Wood,
confining the temporal scope of seizure under the Fourth Amendment
to the instant when the initial seizure occurs perilously suggests that
no remedy exists for people whose property is taken by government
and not properly returned.14' Judge Wood opined that because the
"protection of private property is a high enough value in the Constitu-
tion,"' 142 she would hesitate to "hold sweepingly that the Fourth
Amendment has nothing to do with the reasonableness of the contin-
ued detention of property after the rationale for supporting that initial
seizure no longer holds."'1 43
136. Id. at 472 (Wood, J., concurring). Judge Wood posited that on the facts of Lee's case,
even if the Fourth Amendment applied, the City's demands in this case would not be unreasona-
ble because towing and storage fees are not free services, and to the extent that it is constitu-
tional for government to apportion these costs to victims of crimes, the City's conditional release
of the car upon payment of these fees is reasonable. See Lee, 330 F.3d at 473. In concluding that
the City's "continued seizure" of Lee's car was not unreasonable, Judge Wood found it impor-
tant that "(1) the second seizure was brief in duration, (2) the condition imposed on Lee was
only to pay the actual cost of the towing and storage (i.e., an objectively reasonable sum), and (3)
the City never carried out its threat to destroy the car." Id.
137. Id. at 472.
138. Id. at 474.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 472.
141. Lee, 330 F.3d at 474 (admitting that "it is troubling indeed to think that no remedy at all
exists for people whose property is taken by the government and not properly returned"). Judge
Wood went on to make the argument that if the Fourth Amendment does not speak to the issue
then there is the possibility that one could make a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim argu-
ment. Id. at 474-77. The feasibility of a Takings claim as an alternative remedy to situations
where government has unreasonably refused to return lawfully taken property is discussed in
infra notes 288-307 and accompanying text.
142. Lee, 330 F.3d at 476 (Wood, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 472.
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IV. ANALYSIS: FILLING THE GAP WITH THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Confining the temporal scope of seizure under the Fourth Amend-
ment as the Seventh Circuit did in Lee creates a constitutional gap
that threatens to leave citizens with no remedy when government
seizes their property and does not properly return it.144 Because the
text of the Constitution does not require such a limited reading of the
Fourth Amendment,145 and because the practical reasons offered by
the Seventh Circuit and other courts in rejecting the notion of contin-
uing seizure are unpersuasive in the context of seizures of property, 46
creating such a gap is unwarranted and unwise. Accordingly, when
government legally seizes property under the Fourth Amendment, its
conduct in retaining and returning that property should be evaluated
under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard, even though
the initial act of seizing has already taken place.' 47
A. Requiring Government To Be Reasonable When Returning
Property Is Consistent With the Text of the
Fourth Amendment
At the outset, it must be determined whether the text of the Fourth
Amendment can support the theory of continuing seizure. In other
words, when the Constitution prescribes "[tihe right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against all un-
reasonable searches and seizures," is it concerned only with the initial
act of seizure, or does it continue to ensure that government is acting
reasonably with respect to the property it has already taken? Because
the government has seized a person's property whenever there is
"some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory inter-
ests in that property," 148 it follows that a seizure continues as long as
that person retains that interest, and the Fourth Amendment's protec-
tions continue with it.
144. Other possible remedies and their inability to fill the "gap" absent the Fourth Amend-
ment's protections are discussed in infra notes 146-261 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 146-212 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 213-236 and accompanying text.
147. See infra notes 237-256 and accompanying text.
148. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); see also Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176
F.3d 342, 354 (6th Cir. 1999) (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (applying the
principles of the Supreme Court's seizure of property jurisprudence to conclude that "whenever
the government meaningfully interferes with an individual's interest in property, a 'seizure' sub-
ject to the reasonableness analysis of the Fourth Amendment takes place") (emphasis added).
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1. The Second and Sixth Circuits Stretch to Shrink the Fourth
Amendment
The Jakobetz, Fox, and Lee courts, however, all rejected the premise
that seizure parallels possessory interest. In Jakobetz, the Second Cir-
cuit summarily dismissed Jakobetz's argument that the government's
continued possession of his photographs constituted an illegal seizure
when those photographs, initially legally taken for a prior investiga-
tion, should have been returned to him by statute. 149 The court found
Jakobetz's argument "novel," but did not think that this kind of
seizure deserves the "special protections provided by the fourth
amendment.' 50 It is difficult from the court's brief treatment of the
issue to determine whether the Second Circuit rejected Jakobetz's ar-
gument because it did not believe a seizure could exist beyond the
initial act, or simply, as it stated, could find "no authority to indicate
that Jakobetz's constitutional rights [had] been violated.' 51 In any
event, where the Supreme Court has expressly held that a seizure oc-
curs when government meaningfully interferes with an individual's
possessory interest in property, unless Jakobetz had no property inter-
est in his photographs, it seems premature to set aside Jakobetz's
claim as falling short of the Fourth Amendment's "special
protections."152
The Sixth Circuit in Fox, on the other hand, employed a much more
elaborate textual analysis in rejecting the argument that a refusal to
return lawfully seized property can constitute a seizure. 153 The Fox
court first recognized that the "Supreme Court has established that
one of the purposes of the prohibition on unreasonable seizures of
property is the protection of the individual's property rights in the
seized item.' 54 The court noted, however, that the Supreme Court
cases dealing with seizures of property "all concern state actors' role
in taking possession of property. '155 The Sixth Circuit selected lan-
guage from Justice Stevens's concurrence in Texas v. Brown:156 "The
149. See United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 802-03 (2d Cir. 1992).
150. Id. at 802.
151. Id. The Second Circuit may have been more persuaded by the fact that Jakobetz was
attempting to use the Fourth Amendment to invoke the exclusionary rule where there was an
absence of willful intent on the part of the police. Following its short discussion of Jakobetz's
"novel" illegal seizure claim, the Court asserted that "there would be no purpose in applying the
[exclusionary] rule to this case, where there was no [police] misconduct" since that rule is de-
signed only to deter such misconduct. Id.
152. See id.
153. See Fox, 176 F.3d at 349-51.
154. Id. at 350 (citing Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1992)).
155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. 460 U.S. 730, 747 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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[Fourth] Amendment protects two different interests of the citizen-
the interest in retaining possession of property and the interest in
maintaining personal privacy, '157 and incorporated it into the "mean-
ingful interference with possessory interest" definition of seizure. 158
The conclusion the Fox court drew from this handiwork was that "the
Fourth Amendment protects an individual's interest in retaining pos-
session of property but not the interest in regaining possession of
property."'1 59 Therefore, "[o]nce [the] act of taking the property is
complete, the seizure has ended and the Fourth Amendment no
longer applies." 160
There are several problems with the Sixth Circuit's analysis. First,
the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon the Fox court em-
ployed-that because Justice Stevens's construction of the Fourth
Amendment mentions only retaining property it therefore excludes
any other property interest the Fourth Amendment might protect-is
unpersuasive considering the context of the Brown case. Justice Ste-
vens, in distinguishing between a property interest and a privacy inter-
est, was merely trying to explain how the plain view doctrine allows
the seizure of a closed container when police have probable cause to
believe it contains contraband but still requires that police obtain a
search warrant to actually open it and look inside.161 In other words,
Justice Stevens was suggesting that a particular police action (seizing a
closed container) may threaten one interest (retaining possession of
one's property) while leaving one's privacy interest fully intact. 162 It
does not necessarily follow that Justice Stevens was suggesting that
the only interest in one's property the Fourth Amendment protects is
one of retention. Brown involved the seizure of a green balloon that
police had probable cause to think contained heroin; it did not speak
to whether police could arbitrarily refuse to return the balloon if they
found it contained nothing but hot air.163
Even the Lee majority, which ultimately came to the same conclu-
sion as the Fox majority, found the Sixth Circuit's analysis to be prob-
lematic.1 64 The Lee court first observed that there is nothing in Justice
Stevens's "retention" definition of seizure that "suggest[s] that he had
157. Fox, 176 F.3d at 350 (citing Brown, 460 U.S. at 747 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment)).
158. See id. at 351.
159. Id. (emphasis added).
160. Id.
161. See Brown, 460 U.S. at 747-48 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
162. See id.
163. See id. at 733-35 (majority opinion).
164. See Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2003).
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a temporal restriction in mind when he described the property inter-
est."1 65 The court noted that Justice Stevens's analysis, in fact, is
more consistent with the idea "that an individual's Fourth Amend-
ment rights do not dissipate upon the loss of physical possession" be-
cause Justice Stevens, at the very least, believed that an individual's
privacy interest continues past the point at which the property was
taken. 166 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit recognized that although
the Supreme Court adopted Justice Stevens's distinction between
Fourth Amendment privacy and possessory interests, it did not neces-
sarily assign precedential value to the idea that the Fourth Amend-
ment possessory interest is strictly one of retention. 167
Judge Clay echoed this sentiment in his dissent in Fox, arguing that
the Supreme Court "has long rejected such a limited view of the term
'seizure' under the Fourth Amendment, in favor of the concept that a
'seizure' may take place over a period of time. 1 168 Judge Clay pointed
out that the Supreme Court, in United States v. Place, held that a brief
detention of a traveler's luggage may not initially (at the precise mo-
ment of seizure) violate the Fourth Amendment, but retention of the
luggage for over ninety minutes may turn that once reasonable seizure
into an unreasonable one.169 In other words, the majority's holding in
Fox-that the Fourth Amendment only protects an individual's inter-
est in retaining property-is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
holding in Place because the Fourth Amendment violation in Place
did not occur until after the luggage had already been confiscated.
A final problem with the Sixth Circuit's textual analysis in Fox is
that its ultimate conclusion-that no seizure can occur after an initial
lawful seizure of property- 170 is inapplicable in different but indistin-
guishable factual circumstances. Specifically, such a restrictive defini-
tion of seizure is inconsistent with the Sixth Circuit's construction of
seizure when a person, rather than property, is at issue. In addition,
that court's restrictive definition does not hold up when a person vol-
untarily gives property to the government and is later refused its re-
turn. Understandably, the Fox court refused to address these two
issues. 17' Recall that in Phelps,t72 the Sixth Circuit recognized that
165. Id. (emphasis added).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 356 (6th Cir. 1999) (Clay, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
169. Id. (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)).
170. Id. at 351 (majority opinion).
171. id.
172. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
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applying different standards to police conduct before and after arrest
would create a "distinction in meaning of the Fourth Amendment that
is found nowhere in its language," and thus the reasonableness stan-
dard should govern throughout seizure. 173 Whatever can be said
about the merits of restricting seizure temporally, it is difficult to see
how, looking solely at the text of the Fourth Amendment, the Sixth
Circuit's view in Phelps (that seizure can last beyond the arrest of a
person) can be reconciled with its position in Fox (that the Fourth
Amendment's protections end the minute that property is taken
away). 174 Furthermore, the Fox court explicitly did not address
"whether a 'seizure' occurs when a person voluntarily gives a thing to
a state actor, then asks the state actor to return that thing, and the
state actor refuses to do so. ''175 The Fox majority distinguished this
situation even though, as the dissent points out, the seizure in both
cases "would occur well after the government had completed the act
of taking the property away from its rightful owner .... -176 If by not
addressing the issue the Fox majority was indeed suggesting that a
seizure could occur in this voluntary surrender scenario, it would be
more consistent with Judge Clay's assertion that "the government's
possession of private property, even where it did not begin as a
seizure, might ripen into a seizure with the passage of time .... ",177
The inapplicability of the Fox court's "retention" analysis to other in-
distinguishable seizure contexts suggests that its underlying fidelity to
the text of the Fourth Amendment is lacking.
2. Lee Ignores Supreme Court Precedent
The complexities and inconsistencies in the Fox court's analysis may
be the reason the Seventh Circuit in Lee adopted a much more sim-
plistic and literal definition of seizure in ultimately concluding that the
173. Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230,
241 (6th Cir. 1996) (Ryan, J., concurring in part)) (internal quotation marks omitted). While
Phelps was decided after Fox, Treadway, with its language rejecting a distinction between a pre-
arrest and post-arrest standard, was decided before Fox.
174. It did appear that the Phelps court thought it important that the plaintiff was still in the
arresting officer's custody when the excessive force claim arose. The holding in Fox could be
brought into line with those in Phelps and Treadway if seizure of property extended at least as
long as the government official who initially seized the property still possessed it. On the other
hand, the Fox court's "retention" formula could not be applied consistently in that scenario
because, under that approach, once the official took the property away, the interest in retaining
the property would have expired. Any claim after that would be based on the individual's inter-
est in regaining the property from the official, which the Fox court concludes is beyond the scope
of the Fourth Amendment.
175. Fox, 176 F.3d at 351.
176. Id. at 357 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
177. See id.
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Fourth Amendment only protects an individual's interest in retaining
property. 78 The court in Lee put forth two textual justifications for
the view that once an individual is initially dispossessed of his prop-
erty, the seizure is complete and the Fourth Amendment cannot be
invoked to regain that property. 179 First, the court argued that the
Amendment protects a person's right "'to be secure' in one's home,
person, or effects [, which] suggests a state of being that is protected
against intrusion by unlawful government action."' 180 Accordingly, the
court reasoned, "once that state has been disturbed by an act of dis-
possession, the individual is no longer secure in his possessory interest
within the meaning of the amendment."'' Second, the Seventh Cir-
cuit cited several sources supporting the idea that "at the time of the
fourth amendment's drafting, the word 'seizure' was defined as a tem-
porally limited act, one involving the 'confiscation or forcible taking
possession (of land or goods); a sudden and forcible taking hold."' 182
From this strict construction of the Fourth Amendment, the Lee court
found that "Justice Stevens's description [of Fourth Amendment pro-
tections]-even if lacking in independent precedental value-is con-
sistent with [the Amendment's] literal reading.' 83 Thus, while
acknowledging that the Supreme Court has defined seizure as some
"meaningful interference with a possessory interest," the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Lee held that such a possessory interest "is limited to an indi-
vidual's interest in retaining his property". 184
Such a literal reading of seizure, however, does not fit so easily
within the Supreme Court's construction of seizure as "some meaning-
ful interference with a possessory interest.1 8 5 First, while the text of
the Fourth Amendment does suggest a state of being, it does not limit
that state to the time before dispossession. A reading more in line
with the Supreme Court's definition would be that the Fourth Amend-
ment protects an individual's right to be secure in his property when-
ever he has a possessory interest in that property-and such an
interest exists not only before the act of dispossession, but also while
178. See Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 462-63, 466 (7th Cir. 2003).
179. See id. at 462-63.
180. Id. at 462.
181. Id.
182. Id. (quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTiONARY, supra note 131). The Seventh Circuit also
cited California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991), in which Justice Scalia determined from
three additional dictionaries that the word "seizure" has meant a "taking possession" since the
founding of the United States, and Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 462-63 (1873),
which stated that "[a] seizure is a single act, and not a continuous fact."
183. Lee, 330 F.3d at 463.
184. Id. at 466.
185. Id.
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the government has actual possession. 186 For example, when the City
no longer needed Lee's car as evidence, he had the right to reclaim his
car. 187 Indeed, it could be argued that when the City was still using
Lee's car, he had some residual property interest even then.188 It fol-
lows that whenever such an interest exists, any meaningful interfer-
ence with that right would be a seizure, and the Fourth Amendment
therefore requires the government's conduct concerning that interfer-
ence to be reasonable. In other words, the Fourth Amendment en-
sures not only that the government will act reasonably when taking
property away, but also that individuals are to be secure from unrea-
sonable government action when the right to reacquire their property
still exists.
This reading is also more consistent with the Seventh Circuit's inter-
pretation of the Fourth Amendment in the excessive force context. In
Reed, the Seventh Circuit held that Fourth Amendment protections
extend at least up until the determination of probable cause. 189 It
could be argued, however, that Reed's "state" of security in his person
was "disturbed" at the time of his arrest. Applying the Lee analysis to
Reed: because Reed was no longer "secure" in his "person" after ar-
rest, any conduct occurring after that point would be outside the scope
of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the Lee court's literal reading of
Fourth Amendment seizure in the property context is inconsistent
even with its restrictive interpretation of seizure in the excessive force
context. A more symmetrical construction of property seizure would
extend Fourth Amendment protections as long as an individual has a
possessory interest in the seized property, just as Fourth Amendment
protections in the excessive force context extend for as long as an indi-
vidual has the right to be free from unlawful arrest (which presumably
exists until the arrest is deemed lawful). 190 In sum, the Lee court's
186. Id. at 470 (noting that "Lee maintained a cognizable property interest in his vehicle
throughout the City's possession of it").
187. See Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 355-57 (6th Cir. 1999) (Clay, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
188. See Lee, 330 F.3d at 470 (Wood, J., concurring) (discussing Lee's residual property inter-
est in reclaiming his car even after the City had the right to dispose of it following the thirty day
expiration period). Of course, the City had a much stronger argument for the reasonableness of
the car's retention during this period, where its law enforcement interests are so prevalent.
189. Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 1996).
190. One reason courts may be hesitant to analogize the seizure of a person to the seizure of
property is that there is no required interruption where the probable cause for or reasonableness
of the seizure is determined in seizure of property cases, as the Gerstein hearing does in the
seizure of person context. In cases where there is no forfeiture hearing, there may never be a
determination of whether the seizure of property was reasonable-and thus no obvious point
along the continuum for a court to definitively say that the property seizure has ended. Without
such an interruption, courts appear to have two options: hold the seizure complete after the
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argument that the Fourth Amendment's implicit reference to a state
of being necessarily confines the Amendment's protections to the pe-
riod before that initial state is first disturbed ignores the Supreme
Court's construction that a seizure occurs any time there is a meaning-
ful interference with a possessory interest. Moreover, the argument is
unpersuasive in light of the Seventh Circuit's construction in the ex-
cessive force context.
The Lee court's second textual argument, that a literal reading of
seizure as a temporally limited act justifies restricting Fourth Amend-
ment property rights to those of retention, is also unpersuasive given
the Supreme Court's holding in Place that an initial detention of prop-
erty may, over time, ripen into a seizure that violates the Fourth
Amendment. 191 In Place, the Supreme Court flatly rejected the idea
that there are no degrees of government intrusion and that once the
property is seized, the dispossession is absolute. 192 It noted that "[t]he
intrusion on possessory interests occasioned by a seizure of one's per-
sonal effects can vary both in its nature and extent. ' 193 In fact, Justice
O'Connor noted, "[t]he seizure may be made after the owner has re-
linquished control of the property to a third party or . . . from the
immediate custody and control of the owner. ' 194 The notion that time
can turn a detention of property from reasonable to unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment is inconsistent with the Lee court's in-
terpretation of seizure as a single act which, once accomplished, ends
all Fourth Amendment inquiry. If the Fourth Amendment only pro-
tected Raymond Place's interest in retaining his luggage, the Supreme
Court would have ended its inquiry after the initial seizure of the lug-
gage. Instead, the Court went on to find that the initial seizure, under
Terry principles, 195 did not violate the Fourth Amendment, but that as
time went on the seizure became unreasonable as justified on those
grounds. 196 As the dissent in Fox stated:
[Wihile a seizure may technically occur at the moment the gov-
ernment actually takes an item of personal property, the Court has
initial dispossession as the court in Lee did, or hold that property is seized as long as the owner
still has a legally cognizable property interest. This Note argues for the latter, more protective
alternative.
191. See Fox, 176 F.3d at 355-56 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Place as evidence that the concept that initially lawful seizures can transform into unlawful
seizure is not new to constitutional jurisprudence).
192. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 705 (1983).
193. Id.
194. Id. (emphasis added).
195. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968) (holding that a brief investigatory stop and frisk
without probable cause is not an unreasonable seizure violative of the Fourth Amendment).
196. See Place, 462 U.S. at 703-10.
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long rejected such a limited view of the term 'seizure' under the
Fourth Amendment, in favor of the concept that a 'seizure' may
take place over a period of time.' 97
Both the Lee and Fox courts attempted to explain away the Su-
preme Court's holding in Place by asserting that Place merely "pro-
vide[s] a framework for analyzing when law enforcement agents may
hold someone's property for a very short time on less than probable
cause to pursue a limited course of investigation. '"1 9  The Lee court
reasoned that because Place only dealt with the initial loss of posses-
sory interest and whether that loss is reasonable without probable
cause, "[i]t has no application after probable cause to seize has been
established.' 199 Accordingly, the Lee court concluded that the "time
can turn a reasonable seizure into an unreasonable seizure" analysis
only applies up to the time when a possessory interest is justified by
probable cause. After that, the argument goes, the property is consid-
ered seized and the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable. 2°°
But this incomplete interpretation of Place ignores the essence of its
holding: brief detentions of personal property may be so minimally
intrusive of Fourth Amendment possessory interests that strong coun-
tervailing governmental interests can justify seizure on less than prob-
ably cause, 201 but as the intrusion becomes stronger, that seizure can
become unreasonable and therefore violate the Fourth Amendment.20 2
In other words, the Supreme Court in Place emphasized balancing the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the government in-
terest that justified the intrusion as a way to determine whether a
seizure is reasonable, not whether one has occurred.20 3 Indeed, the
Court in Place made clear:
There is no doubt that the agents made a 'seizure' of Place's lug-
gage for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when, following his
refusal to consent to a search, the agent told Place that he was going
to take the luggage to a federal judge to secure issuance of a
warrant.2
0 4
197. Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 356 (6th Cir. 1999) (Clay, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
198. Id. at 351 n.6 (majority opinion); see also Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 464 (7th
Cir. 2003) (quoting Fox, 176 F.3d at 351 n.6).
199. Lee, 330 F.3d at 464.
200. See id. at 462-64.
201. Place, 462 U.S. at 706.
202. See Fox, 176 F.3d at 355-56 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
and discussing the holding in Place, 462 U.S. at 706, 710).
203. See id.
204. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
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Thus, the Place Court first determined that there was in fact a seizure,
then determined that that seizure was reasonable by balancing inter-
ests, but later found that the seizure became unreasonable as the rela-
tive intrusions and interests changed. 205 The Court did not, as the Lee
majority argued, "deal only with the transformation of a momentary,
investigative detention into a seizure"20 6 but rather dealt with the
transformation of a momentary, investigative, reasonable seizure into
an unreasonable seizure. 20 7 Therefore, the Lee court's holding that
the Fourth Amendment protects only an individual's interest in retain-
ing his property cannot account for the Supreme Court's finding that
Place's Fourth Amendment rights were violated ninety minutes after
an initial, reasonable seizure of his property had taken place.208
3. Government "Seizes" Property as Long as the Individual Has the
Right to Get It Back
A more useful and "common sense" construction of seizure in the
property context will take into account the Supreme Court's "mean-
ingful interference with possessory interest" definition and may look
analogous to Justice Ginsburg's view of the definition and duration of
seizure in Albright.20 9 While Albright dealt with a different issue-
whether an individual is still seized as a pretrial detainee when he has
been released on bail-Justice Ginsburg's analysis of the temporal
scope of the Fourth Amendment is nevertheless informative. 210 In her
concurrence, Justice Ginsburg argued that a criminal defendant, even
after being released on bail, is still seized under the Fourth Amend-
ment because he or she is required to appear in court upon command
and he or she is restricted from otherwise exercising unquestionable
rights, such as the right to travel. 211 In other words, even though an
individual is not technically being detained, his liberty interest is still
diminished-"he remains apprehended, arrested in his movements,
indeed 'seized' for trial .... "212 This conception of continuing seizure
suggests that as long as the government is interfering with some inter-
est protected by the Fourth Amendment, a liberty interest in Al-
bright's case, he or she remains seized within the meaning of the
Amendment. Similarly, when the government interferes with one's
205. See id. at 707-11.
206. Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 464 (7th Cir. 2003).
207. Place, 462 U.S. at 710.
208. Id. at 707.
209. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 276-81 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
210. See id.
211. Id. at 278.
212. Id. at 279.
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possessory interest under the Fourth Amendment by taking posses-
sion of his or her property, that property is seized within the meaning
of the Amendment. If the property was, for example, contraband, the
individual probably would not have a possessory interest in that prop-
erty and the seizure would be complete, with no Fourth Amendment
claim available after the initial detention.2 13 On the other hand, when
an individual such as Lee still has a possessory interest in his property,
any meaningful interference by government with that interest should
be evaluated under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard.
This conception also comports with the idea that the Framers meant
for "people to be secure" in their property against any unlawful intru-
sion by government, and most likely did not intend to forbid govern-
ment from arbitrarily taking property while sanctioning its arbitrary
retention of that property. Justice Ginsburg's "common sense" under-
standing of seizure, where seizure continues as long as an otherwise
"unquestioned" right is subject to government's control, is both con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's "meaningful interference with pos-
sessory interest" definition of seizure and true to the text of the
Fourth Amendment.21 4
B. Seventh Circuit Excessive Force Precedent Does Not Analogize
in the Property Context
In addition to arguing that the text of the Fourth Amendment can-
not support the notion of continuing seizure, the Seventh Circuit in
Lee also offered the two practical objections first put forth in Wilkins
to justify limiting the temporal scope of the Fourth Amendment.2 15 In
Wilkins, the Seventh Circuit rejected continuing seizure in the exces-
sive force context because: (1) traditional Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence would "prove unhelpful" in cases where the suspect was
already in custody, and (2) allowing Fourth Amendment analysis to
extend beyond that traditional context "would lead to an 'unwar-
ranted expansion of constitutional law."' 216 Because the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard is already used in and is well
213. In the case of contraband, an individual may actually have a property interest sufficient
to invoke the exclusionary rule as a result of an illegal seizure, but he of course would not have
the right, relevant in this situation, to have the contraband returned to him. See generally United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (holding that defendant was not entitled to have narcotics, as
contraband, returned to him, although narcotics could be considered his property to the effect
that he could suppress them at trial because they were seized illegally); see also 68 AM. JUR. 2D,
supra note 91, § 304.
214. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 278-79 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
215. Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 463-64 (7th Cir. 2003).
216. Id. at 463 (quoting Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1989)).
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equipped to deal with return of property cases, these objections are
unpersuasive in the seizure of property context.
1. Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence Would Be Useful in Return of
Property Cases
The Lee court offers the first Wilkins objection-that prior deci-
sions applying the reasonableness standard to police conduct during
arrest are "inapplicable" once the arrest has already taken place-as
support for its conclusion that the Fourth Amendment standard would
similarly be unhelpful in resolving issues concerning the time after the
initial seizure of property.21 7 In Wilkins, the Seventh Circuit held that
because Fourth Amendment jurisprudence concerning the seizure of a
person has focused on "whether the force used to seize the suspect
was excessive in relation to the danger he posed,' '2 18 the "text, history
and judicial interpretations of the Fourth Amendment" 219 would be
unhelpful in resolving excessive force cases where a suspect is already
lawfully in custody.220 Because Fourth Amendment principles appar-
ently do not "illuminate" whether an interrogation was too coercive,
the Wilkins court decided due process principles were a better guide
in cases where excessive force was applied after arrest.22 ' The Lee
court analogized this argument in the property context and pro-
claimed that "a government's decision regarding how and when to re-
turn once lawfully obtained property 'raises different issues, which the
text, history, and judicial interpretations of the Fourth Amendment do
not illuminate.'" 22 2 The argument is that because Fourth Amendment
precedent has focused on the initial deprivation of property (usually
issues involving whether there was probable cause to seize the prop-
erty), due process law (which involves requirements such as forfeiture
hearings) would be more useful in weighing government interests in
retaining property against an individual's interest in regaining that
property. 223
But the availability of due process principles to decide issues con-
cerning the return of once lawfully seized property does not obviate or
make impractical the application of Fourth Amendment principles to
the same issues. First, where both the Fourth Amendment and the
Due Process Clause appear to be applicable, the Supreme Court has
217. See id. at 463, 465.
218. Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 193.
219. Id. at 194.
220. Id. at 193-94; see also Lee, 330 F.3d at 463.
221. See Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 193-94.
222. Lee, 330 F.3d at 465 (paraphrasing Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 194).
223. See id. at 465-66.
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preferred to apply the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard
because it is an "explicit textual source of constitutional protection"
against the particular type of government misconduct asserted. 224 To
the extent that government's refusal to return once legally obtained
property constitutes a seizure,225 the reasonableness standard is more
appropriate than generalized due process principles and is certainly
not foreclosed merely because due process elements may be involved.
Moreover, when the Wilkins court decided traditional due process
principles better guided courts when a suspect was already in custody,
it was because the usual issue in cases where the excessive force was
applied during the arrest was "whether the force used to seize the
suspect was excessive in relation to the danger he posed ... if left at
large. ' 226 This inquiry is obviously extraneous when the suspect is al-
ready in custody. On the other hand, the usual inquiry in seizure of
property cases is whether the particular government interest at issue
justifies the interference with an individual's property interest.227 This
inquiry is still relevant and informative when evaluating a govern-
ment's decision to return once lawfully seized property. Finally, as the
dissent in Fox points out, federal courts already apply the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard when deciding, under a motion
invoking Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 228
whether to return seized property after criminal proceedings have ter-
minated.229 The Fox dissent notes that "Rule 41(e) recognizes the
224. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (holding that "[b]ecause the Fourth Amend-
ment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against ... physically intru-
sive governmental conduct [in excessive force cases], that Amendment, not the more generalized
notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims"). Compare
this to Justice Stevens's dissent in Albright, where he argued that "[niothing in Graham, how-
ever, forecloses a general due process claim when a more specific source of protection is absent
or, [is] open to question," and thus recognized that both due process and Fourth Amendment
principles may be applicable. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 305-06 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
225. See supra notes 149-208 and accompanying text.
226. Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 193.
227. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703-06 (1983) (evaluating whether law enforce-
ment interests in investigating possible narcotics trafficking justifies the brief detention of a trav-
eler's luggage on less than probable cause).
228. Rule 41(g) provides:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the depriva-
tion of property may move for the property's return. The motion must be filed in the
district where the property was seized. The court must receive evidence on any factual
issue necessary to decide the motion. If it grants the motion, the court must return the
property to the movant, but may impose reasonable conditions to protect access to the
property and its use in later proceedings.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g).
229. Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 356 (6th Cir. 1999) (Clay, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (referring to what then was the relevant provision, FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)).
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right of a person to obtain the return of lawfully seized property
'when aggrieved by the government's possession of it,' and not just at
the time of the initial seizure. '230 Thus, the Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness standard not only "illuminates" issues regarding govern-
ment conduct after an initial seizure, but is already considered
"helpful" in weighing the competing interests at stake in such cases.
2. Balancing Interests Would Protect Against Expansion of
Constitutional Law
The Seventh Circuit also argues in Lee, as it did in Wilkins, that
employing Fourth Amendment analysis outside its "traditional con-
text . . . would lead to an 'unwarranted expansion of constitutional
law." 231 Lee repeated Judge Posner's classic example from Wilkins,
that if an officer were to stick out his tongue at a suspect in an interro-
gation it would certainly be considered unreasonable, but
[wJould it therefore make the "continuing seizure" ... violative of
the Fourth Amendment? Surely not. But why not? There are no
obvious limiting principles within the amendment itself. The prob-
lem is that the concept of continuing seizure attenuated the element
that makes police conduct in the arrest situation problematic: the
police are taking away a person's liberty. Custodial interrogation
does not curtail a person's freedom of action; it presupposes that he
has already lost that freedom-for by definition he is already in
custody.232
Similar to the first objection, this argument maintains that the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard focuses on the initial depriva-
tion of liberty and thus is ill-suited to deal with problems arising from
government misconduct outside that context. 233 Here, however,
Judge Posner is apparently concerned that the balancing of interests
using that standard may extend constitutional protections to trivial
claims. 234 The Lee court reasoned that when deprivation of property
is at issue, the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard would
similarly be ill-suited to evaluate government conduct after the initial
detention of property has taken place. 235
This argument, however, ignores the fact that after the initial
seizure of property, a person still has a property interest that the
230. Id. (quoting the advisory committee's note to the 1989 amendments).
231. Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Wilkins, 872 F.2d at
194).
232. Id. at 463-64 (quoting Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 194).
233. See id. at 465.
234. See Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1160 n.3 (10th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the practical
objections in Wilkins).
235. See Lee, 330 F.3d at 465-66.
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Fourth Amendment protects, and if that interest was indeed trivial, it
would be outweighed by a more pressing government interest. Unlike
the custodial interrogation context, where one could argue that a per-
son has already lost his liberty interest, a seizure in the property con-
text occurs whenever government meaningfully interferes with a
property interest. For someone like Lee, this property interest would
be his right to possession of his car when the City no longer had any
use for it. It is not then an "unwarranted expansion," but actually
quite appropriate to apply Fourth Amendment principles to govern-
ment's refusal to return once lawfully seized property because there
continues to be a Fourth Amendment interest to protect. Moreover,
courts can easily apply the balancing test outlined in Place, weighing
the quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interest against the government's countervailing interest in procuring
evidence, when evaluating a government's decision not to return
property. 236 Applying this test would summarily dispense with trivial
claims because the individual's interest in reacquiring his property
would be substantially outweighed by government's interest in keep-
ing the property. Therefore, although it may not be useful to ask
whether government misconduct in the interrogation room was rea-
sonable, it certainly makes sense to require government's conduct
concerning the return of an individual's private property to be reason-
able.237 Accordingly, the argument that extending Fourth Amend-
ment protections into this area is an "unwarranted expansion" is
unpersuasive as a practical objection.
C. Applying the Fourth Amendment to Return of Property Cases
What should a return of property case look like? Simply enough, it
should look like any Fourth Amendment seizure of property case, the
only difference being that the government may already have posses-
sion of the property when the seizure occurs. If the seizure is unrea-
sonable, there is a Fourth Amendment violation and the owner of the
property is entitled to its unconditional return.
236. See Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 355-57 (6th Cir. 1999) (Clay, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
237. And even in the interrogation context, Judge Posner's example is unpersuasive. The po-
liceman's sticking out his tongue is undoubtedly stupid and childish, but it does not make the
detention unreasonable. It is hard to believe that, in applying the Fourth Amendment to this
scenario, a court would actually find a violation. Indeed, it is unlikely that many § 1983 actions
would be brought on such facts. But even if they were, a court balancing interests under the
Fourth Amendment should not have difficulty dismissing such a suit. The due process clause
may be a tougher standard to conquer, but it does not follow that a reasonableness requirement
could not adequately dispose of truly trivial claims (while leaving more room for meritous cases).
20061
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The threshold question is whether a seizure has occurred. 238 Em-
ploying the Supreme Court's construction as "some meaningful inter-
ference with an individual's possessory interest, '239 a seizure of
property occurs whenever government action intrudes on such an in-
terest.240 Thus, in a return of property case, the seizure continues as
long as the individual still retains a possessory interest-whenever he
has the right to its eventual return, for instance.241 For example, when
the police take your camcorder because they suspect it may contain a
recording of a famous pop star's indiscretions, the police have seized
your property and it continues to be seized until you get it back.242
During that seizure, the Fourth Amendment applies and mandates
that the government's conduct be reasonable.2 43 Therefore, when you
petition the police for the return of your camcorder, an unreasonable
refusal could constitute a seizure violative of the Fourth Amendment.
When might such a seizure be unreasonable? According to Place:
We must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the indi-
vidual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. When the
nature and extent of the detention are minimally intrusive of the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests, the opposing law enforce-
238. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (espousing the
desirability of answering the "threshold question" of whether a search or seizure "covered" by
the Fourth Amendment "has occurred" before "leap[ing]" to the question of whether a search or
seizure was reasonable).
239. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
240. See infra notes 204-209 and accompanying text.
241. See infra notes 204-209 and accompanying text.
242. An alternative construction that the plaintiff in Fox put forth, and that Lee argued in the
alternative, is that there was an initial seizure-the taking of Fox's license and Lee's car-fol-
lowed by a second, "additional" seizure, which occurred when the government no longer needed
the property and refused to return it. See Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 349 (6th Cir.
1982); see also Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 460 (7th Cir. 2003). While appealing be-
cause of its apparent simplicity, this approach confuses the question of when a seizure occurs
with when it is unreasonable. This is because a court must determine whether the government's
diminished interest in the property justifies the property's return before the court determines
whether the refusal constitutes a "second seizure." See Lee, 330 F.3d at 460 (summarizing Lee's
argument that the initial impoundment of his car to search for evidence was reasonable but the
"additional" seizure, which occurred only after the City had concluded its search, was not). This
approach would also be inconsistent with the "meaningful interference with possessory interest"
definition, because it implies that the property is not seized between the initial and "additional"
seizure, even though the possessory interest remains constant throughout. Either construction
would likely yield the same result, but to stay consistent with traditional Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the threshold question of whether a seizure has occurred (has there been a mean-
ingful interference with a possessory interest), should be answered before the reasonableness of
that seizure is evaluated. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
243. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV (guaranteeing the people the right to be secure against unreason-
able seizures).
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ment interests can support a seizure based on less than probable
cause.
244
As the dissent in Fox points out, this balancing test has clear applica-
tion in return of property cases.2 45 The advisory committee's note for
Rule 41(e) (the former return of property rule) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure already urges this standard in such cases:
[R]easonableness under all the circumstances must be the test when
a person seeks to obtain the return of property. If the United States
has a need for the property in an investigation or prosecution, its
retention of the property generally is reasonable. But, if the United
States' legitimate interests can be satisfied even if the property is
returned, continued retention of the property would become
unreasonable. 2
46
Thus, notwithstanding the potential elusiveness of a reasonableness
standard, a clear rule emerges when the Fourth Amendment com-
mands return of property cases: if the property is no longer needed,
give it back.
Of course, it will not always be so simple. In Lee, for example, the
City incurred the expense of towing and storing Lee's car. The deci-
sion to condition the car's return upon Lee's paying the towing and
storage fees must be evaluated with that expense in mind. In other
words, it certainly would be unreasonable for the City to charge Lee if
it incurred no expense while using the car in its investigation-the
City would have no legitimate interest in keeping it. On the other
hand, if the City accepted responsibility for every expense associated
with procuring evidence, it would likely draw little complaint from
Lee and others in his position-but it would not be reasonable. Such
an allocation of the City's resources would divert substantial funds
away from other important law enforcement functions, as well as
many other government functions, and the cost to the public of such a
policy would likely outweigh Lee's interest in not paying the fees.
This, in fact, is why Judge Wood concurred in Lee and disagreed only
with the majority's refusal to employ the Fourth Amendment to come
to the same conclusion. 247 But what if the City had indeed destroyed
Lee's car after thirty days, or did not destroy it but refused to negoti-
ate the price for its return, keeping the car indeterminately while stor-
age fees accumulated? The City could put forth a legitimate law
244. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983), quoted in Fox, 176 F.3d at 355 (Clay, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
245. Fox, 176 F.3d at 356 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
246. Id. (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) advisory committee's note (1989)).
247. See Lee, 330 F.3d at 473-74 (Wood, J., concurring) (stating that "[o]n these facts, I would
say that there was no Fourth Amendment violation commencing with the second seizure, be-
cause whatever continued seizure occurred in this particular situation was not unreasonable").
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enforcement interest in these scenarios, but as they become more in-
trusive on Lee's property interests, they are more likely to be unrea-
sonable, and more likely to violate the Fourth Amendment. Weighing
these interests in each case will protect private citizens from arbitrary
government interference while recognizing that lesser intrusions are
appropriate where the public's right to efficient and effective law en-
forcement is compelling.
What are some guideposts to help determine whether refusing to
return property is reasonable under this standard? Because each case
should be evaluated on its facts, different considerations will be appli-
cable in different cases-but several factors will likely always be rele-
vant. Judge Wood, for example, thought it important that the length
of time the City kept Lee's car after it lost its evidentiary value was
brief.248 She also required that the condition imposed for the car's
return was an objectively reasonable sum-the actual cost of towing
and storage but no more.249 That the City never carried out its threat
to destroy the car was also a consideration. 250 The length of the
seizure, the reasonableness of any monetary conditions imposed, and
disposition of the property in the event those conditions are not im-
mediately met, will all likely be helpful to a court in evaluating the
reasonableness of a particular intrusion. In addition, the relative
value of the property to the individual should be relevant-an individ-
ual's home or a family's only car will likely carry more weight than the
camcorder might.251 Another consideration should be the accessibil-
ity of information regarding how and when the property can be re-
trieved. These factors should be weighed against the government's
law enforcement needs in the particular case: the evidentiary value of
the property to the case, the need to extend the seizure to assure a
thorough investigation, and the cost incurred by placing the burden on
the public rather than apportioning it to the individual. The circum-
stances of the initial seizure may also be relevant here. For example,
if Lee were implicated in the shooting and arrested, but later found to
be innocent, he likely regains his full possessory interest in his car, but
it may be more reasonable for the City to demand towing and storage
fees in this scenario because Lee's possible involvement in the crime
made the initial seizure and any subsequent expenses more justifia-
248. Id. at 473.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. This factor should take into account each individual's circumstances but should be
viewed as objectively as possible since most plaintiffs will argue that all of their property is
invaluable.
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ble.2 52 A court should evaluate the events of a particular seizure "as a
whole. '253 As the relevant countervailing interests shift throughout
the duration of the seizure, it is possible that a seizure that was once
reasonable becomes unreasonable, 254 at which point the return of the
individual's property should be unconditional.
What is important to remember is that the "essential purpose of the
proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of
'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government offi-
cials, including law enforcement agents, in order 'to safeguard the pri-
vacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.'1, 255 This
protection was meant to encompass individuals' property interests,
2 56
and the Amendment seeks to "strike[ ] a balance" between these im-
portant rights and the public's right in "effecting searches and seizures
for law enforcement purposes. ' 257 Return of property cases will inva-
riably involve both of these opposing interests and will necessarily re-
quire balancing to ensure that neither is overlooked. It is illogical to
distinguish between the situation where government acts unreasona-
bly in taking property and where it acts just as unreasonably with re-
gard to the property's return. As noted above, the practical objections
to applying the Fourth Amendment in these cases are unavailing, as
are superficial arguments professing that a seizure can only refer to a
single moment in time. Given the importance the Framer's placed on
property interests2 58 and the explicit formula outlined in the Fourth
Amendment to protect these interests in the law enforcement context,
252. Cf. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 538-39 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating
that the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable to return of property cases where the property
owner is incarcerated). Considering the property owner's possible implication in the crime as a
factor can explain the Fox majority's hesitation in extending its holding to cases where an indi-
vidual voluntarily relinquishes his property. See supra notes 149-177 and accompanying text.
253. Lee, 330 F.3d at 473 (Wood, J., concurring).
254. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707-10 (1983) (holding that the length of the
seizure aggravated the "brevity" of the intrusion which, coupled with a lack of diligence on the
part of the police in pursuing their investigation, made what may have been a reasonable investi-
gative seizure, an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment).
255. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. 307, 312 (1978)); see also Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (observing that
"[t]he basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials").
256. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. (guaranteeing "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their ...
houses, papers, and effects"); see also Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 62 (1992) (noting that
"[Supreme Court] cases unmistakably hold that the Amendment protects property as well as
privacy").
257. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 67 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
258. See infra note 309 and accompanying text.
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holding the Fourth Amendment "irrelevant" to return of property
cases is incorrect, and borders on irresponsible.
D. The Lee Court Adopts Due Process
Unwilling to "extend" Fourth Amendment protections to the return
of seized property and finding that the text of the Fourth Amendment
speaks only to the retention of property, the Seventh Circuit in Lee
found the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's due process require-
ments to be a better approach.2 59 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit
found the issue of the City's refusal to return Lee's car to be one
which "concerns the fairness and integrity of the criminal justice pro-
cess, '260 and that the text, history, and judicial interpretations of the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause create the proper framework
for balancing the legitimacy of a government's fiscal interests261 in re-
taining property against an individual's competing interest in regain-
ing his property.2 62 But denying Lee and others in a similar position
the protection of the Fourth Amendment and relying on Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees or other alternatives may have
broad and sweeping consequences. The Seventh Circuit's holding in
Lee creates an unwarranted constitutional gap which, as discussed in
the next section, may leave individuals unprotected when government
takes their property and unreasonably refuses to give it back.2 63
V. IMPACT: THE BROAD IMPLICATIONS OF
LEE V. CITY OF CHICAGO
As Judge Wood notes in her concurrence, the majority in Lee
"hold[s] sweepingly that the Fourth Amendment has nothing to do
with the reasonableness of the continued detention of property after
the rationale supporting the initial seizure no longer holds. ' 264 Pro-
claiming her doubt that the Fourth Amendment "is utterly irrelevant
to the reasonableness of a decision to refuse to relinquish seized prop-
erty once the government has no need for it" Judge Wood focuses on
259. Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 2003). The Fifth Amendment provides
that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of ... property without due process of the law," U.S.
CONsT. amend. V, and the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State ... shall deprive
any person of... property ... without due process of the law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
260. Lee, 330 F.3d at 465.
261. Id. at 466. The court found that because probable cause was no longer the City's justifi-
cation for keeping Lee's car, the government interest was not a law enforcement interest but was
better characterized as "fiscal." Id. at 465.
262. See id. at 464-66.
263. See id. at 472-77 (Wood, J., concurring).
264. Id. at 472.
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the "risk[s of] creating an unwarranted gap in the constitutional pro-
tections that exist with respect to governmental takings of prop-
erty. ' 265 This section discusses the implications of rejecting the
continuing seizure approach with respect to property.266
A. Due Process Tips the Scale
The danger of finding the Fourth Amendment inapplicable to gov-
ernment conduct after the initial seizure of an individual's property is
that it may leave that person with no recourse against government
conduct which amounts to a de facto forfeiture of personal prop-
erty.267 Both the Lee and Fox majority rely on the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments for this protec-
tion.268 The Supreme Court has held that a person has a valid proce-
dural due process claim when a state system destroys a property
interest "without according him proper procedural safeguards. '269
Furthermore, an individual has a valid substantive due process chal-
lenge when government conduct deprives him either of a fundamental
right or of a property interest after all state law remedies have been
exhausted. 270 Each of these avenues has limitations which, absent
Fourth Amendment protection, may leave individuals whose property
rights have been infringed upon out in the cold.
The problem with relying on procedural due process is that it is too
easily satisfied-it does not itself hold government to a specific stan-
dard of conduct. Generally, due process is satisfied where there is
notice and a hearing.271 Thus, the City of Chicago most likely pro-
vided Lee with due process when it warned him that he had thirty
265. Lee, 330 F.3d at 472 (Wood, J., concurring).
266. See infra notes 267-307 and accompanying text.
267. Lee, 330 F.3d at 474 (Wood, J., concurring).
268. See id. at 466 (majority opinion); Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 352 (6th Cir. 1999)
(noting that stretching the Fourth Amendment temporally would "replace for many cases the
well-developed procedural due process analysis that provides the states with first chance to pre-
vent possible constitutional wrongs").
269. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 423 (1982) (holding that where a state
employment commission failed to file a timely conference to hear a complaint, and that system
then barred itself from hearing the action as a result of the such a failure, the complainant has
been denied his property interest without due process of law).
270. Lee, 330 F.3d at 467.
271. Fox, 176 F.3d at 349. Notice and hearing are the requirements for predeprivation pro-
cess, which is most relevant to the issues discussed in this Note, even though the individual will
already be physically deprived of the property as a result of the initial seizure. This is because in
return of property cases, the relevant period of deprivation does not accrue until the original
justification for seizing the property is extinguished-at which point notice and hearing are re-
quired to satisfy due process. Postdeprivation due process is satisfied when state tort remedies
are adequate. Id.
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days to pay the towing and storage fees or to request a hearing.272
While the constitutionality of requiring Lee to pay these fees is debat-
able, 273 the question turns on the reasonableness of the fees, not on
whether Lee was provided notice and a hearing. For instance, as
Judge Wood points out, requiring Lee to pay $100,000 or sign over the
deed to his home in order to retrieve his car would be "plainly unlaw-
ful."'274 But it is not so obvious that such a condition would violate the
Due Process Clause, provided that the City gave Lee adequate notice
and some sort of forfeiture hearing. Moreover, these basic elements
can be satisfied facially but may be so burdensome as to constructively
prohibit an individual from reacquiring his property, for example a
policy which compels the owner of seized property to secure a release
order from his arresting officer.275 Authorizing any government-im-
posed condition for return of property-assuming notice and a forfei-
ture hearing were provided-without requiring that condition to be
reasonable places perilously few restrictions on government's power
to seize, and keep, a person's property.
Similarly, relying on broad substantive due process principles as a
guide to analyze whether government has overstepped its bounds with
regard to returning an individual's private property may also unjustifi-
ably restrict possible recourse for that individual. The Supreme Court
has held "that '[tihe touchstone of due process is protection of the
272. "Most likely" because Lee did not actually bring a procedural due process challenge. See
Lee, 330 F.3d at 466.
273. See supra notes 231-258 and accompanying text.
274. Lee, 330 F.3d at 473 (Wood, J., concurring).
275. See generally Gates v. Towery, 331 F. Supp. 2d 666, 668 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (reconsidering
plaintiff's due process claim alleging that the City of Chicago had a "policy of issuing incomplete,
false, and misleading receipts to arrestees whose property is taken for inventory purposes at the
time of arrest [which] 'is designed to prevent, delay, and impede the return of non-forfeitable
property to the rightful owners"'). Consider a variation of the facts in Robins v. Harum, 773
F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1985), where the defendant officers dragged the plaintiffs out of the car after
an argument about whether plaintiffs could smoke in the back seat. Suppose the officers had
confiscated two hundred dollars at arrest. Even if the officers' conduct in that case was reasona-
ble, one would not blame the Robinses for being hesitant to track down those officers and de-
mand their signature on a release form. To the extent that such a signature is unnecessary and
the requirement is employed only to "impede the return of non-forfeitable property to the right-
ful owners," it certainly would be unreasonable, but likely meets the requirements of due pro-
cess. Compare Gates, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 670, where the court deemed the due process challenge
worthy of reconsideration but only because the policy directly interfered with the notice and
hearing requirements through issuance of an inventory receipt "which falsely represent[ed] the
process through which arrestees can recover their property." It seems likely that the motion to
dismiss in Gates would have been granted had the policy been "designed to prevent, delay, and
impede the return of non-forfeitable property" through means other than interfering with notice
and hearing.
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individual against arbitrary action by government" 276 but that "only
the most egregious official conduct can be said to be 'arbitrary in the
constitutional sense .... ,',277 Thus, unless a fundamental right is at
stake,278 "[S]ubstantive due process requires only that the practice be
rationally related to a legitimate government interest, or alternatively
phrased, that the practice be neither arbitrary nor irrational."2 79 Fur-
thermore, when the challenge "involves only the deprivation of a
property interest," 280 the aggrieved must show the inadequacy of state
law remedies "before the court will even engage in this deferential
rational-basis review. 1281
Of course, the inherent difficulty in bringing a successful substan-
tive due process claim does not compel a broadening of the Fourth
Amendment to cover a potential constitutional gap, but it does create
the danger that the standard used for balancing an individual's inter-
est in his or her property against the government's countervailing law
enforcement interests will be unjustly skewed in favor of the govern-
ment. Consider Judge Wood's response to the majority's point2 82 in
Lee that evaluating an individual's interest in regaining his property is
better analyzed under due process principles than under the Fourth
Amendment:
[All1 individuals in society are benefited by law enforcement ac-
tivities, and all (presumably including crime victims) must therefore
bear some of the burdens that go along with police activity ...
Even so, the government's law enforcement interests surely do not
confer on police a roving warrant to seize and keep any private
property they want, for however long they want to keep it. Our task
is to find the proper balance between those law enforcement inter-
ests and the general citizen's interest in her property. I therefore
disagree with the majority, to the extent it has taken the position
that the City's interest was primarily fiscal by the time Lee wanted
to retrieve the car. Instead, we need to look at the events as a
whole. Doing so, it is important to me that the (1) the second
seizure was brief in duration, (2) the condition imposed on Lee was
only to pay the actual cost of the towing and storage (i.e., an objec-
276. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)).
277. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
278. This would be the case if the conduct involved a Fourth Amendment violation.
279. Lee, 330 F.3d at 467. Predictably, this is a hard standard to meet. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at
860-62 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (advocating judicial restraint in finding substan-
tive due process violations).
280. Lee, 330 F.3d at 467.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 465.
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tively reasonable sum), and (3) the City never carried out its threat
to destroy the car.283
Judge Wood's concern that precluding Fourth Amendment protec-
tions in this context and only requiring that government not act arbi-
trarily or irrationally would endow government with a "roving
warrant" is well taken. It is hard to imagine a situation where govern-
ment cannot espouse some interest furthered by its retention of per-
sonal property, especially when any "fiscal" interest is adequate.
Indeed, concern about the ease with which government might initially
seize personal property was likely the impetus behind the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness requirement. 284 Again, it is inconsistent
to hold that the Constitution forbids government from being unrea-
sonable when acquiring an individual's property but permits govern-
ment to act unreasonably (albeit rationally) in refusing its return. This
inconsistency suggests that such a constitutional gap was never meant
to exist, and that while such "gaps can and do exist, it is not a good
idea to create them inadvertently. '285
The Supreme Court has held that where "a constitutional claim is
covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or
Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard
appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substan-
tive due process. '2 86 Relying on generalized due process guarantees
instead of applying a standard explicitly set out in the Constitution to
govern a particular situation risks subjecting citizens to less protection
of their property interests than the Constitution requires. To the ex-
tent that the Fourth Amendment protects an individual's interest in
reacquiring his property, as is argued in this Note, applying the lesser
standard of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments may mean that "no
remedy at all exists for people whose property is taken and not prop-
erly returned. '2 87
283. Id. at 473 (Wood, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
284. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (explaining that "[t]he basic purpose
of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of [the Supreme] Court, is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials"); see also BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS, AND LAND-USE REGULATION 13-46 (1997) (discussing generally the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights to shield private property interests against
federal intrusion).
285. Lee, 330 F.3d at 472 (Wood, J., concurring).
286. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997) (interpreting Graham v. O'Connor,
490 U.S. 386 (1989)).
287. Lee, 330 F.3d at 474 (Wood, J., concurring).
786 [Vol. 55:745
RIGHT OF RETURN
B. Takings: A Risky Alternative
One likely implication of holding the Fourth Amendment "irrele-
vant" to return of property cases is that courts will look to the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause to fill the constitutional gap widened by
the inadequacy of the due process clauses. The Constitution's impera-
tive that "private property [not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation" 288 may be the only viable alternative when courts re-
fuse to hold that no constitutional restrictions exist with respect to
government's power to seize and keep private property.28 9 Supreme
Court precedent dealing with the duty to provide evidence, however,
in addition to the pervasiveness of the same temporal issues that
plague the Fourth Amendment, may severely limit the applicability of
the Takings Clause to these kinds of cases. The Fourth Amendment's
specific parameters with respect to government treatment of private
property will better safeguard these important property rights in the
criminal procedure context.
1. Judge Wood's Takings Claim
Lee himself did not argue that the City's refusal to return his car
constituted a taking for which he should be compensated,290 but Judge
Wood's concurrence outlined a hypothetical takings claim that she felt
should at least be an alternative if Lee was barred from relief under
the Fourth Amendment.291 According to Judge Wood, Lee's case ap-
pears to meet the criteria of a valid takings claim.292 In other words,
(1) Lee had a property interest in his car; (2) the City actually took his
car ("physical occupation is enough" 293 and "[t]he fact that the taking
... was temporary rather than permanent is of no consequence"); 294
and (3) and the City took Lee's car for a public purpose.295 If success-
ful, Wood posited, Lee might seek compensation for the "reasonable
value of the use of the car during the period that it was held by the
288. U.S. CoNs-r. amend. V.
289. See Lee, 330 F.3d at 476-77 (Wood, J., concurring).
290. Id. at 466 n.5 (majority opinion) (observing that "[o]ther courts have likened continued
retention of evidence as a taking without just compensation.... [But] Lee makes no such argu-
ment before this court").
291. See id. at 475-77 (Wood, J., concurring).
292. See id. at 474-75.
293. Id. at 475.
294. Id. at 474.
295. Lee, 330 F.3d at 474 (Wood, J., concurring).
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City after the initial seizure was finished" or for any damage done to
the car while the City temporarily used it.296
Because individuals in Lee's position are concerned with ensuring
that their property rights are not subrogated to every whim of public
exigency, the Takings Clause does seem to be the logical Constitu-
tional safeguard in such cases. After all, as one commentator put it:
"The just compensation requirement functions as an important check
on a government's temptation to provide services by expropriating
private property. '297 The issue is whether the property owner is being
forced to "bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole." 298
Individuals in Lee's shoes-innocent bystanders whose property is
needed by police for a criminal prosecution-are in a good position to
argue that requiring them alone to bear the cost of the investigation is
unjust.2 9 9 Moreover, even if the initial seizure of Lee's property (the
period during which the City actually had need of the car for its inves-
296. Id. at 475. These remedies illustrate the awkward fit a takings claim might have in this
context. For instance, does prevailing on a takings claim mean that the City must drop all of the
towing and storage fees in addition to "just compensation" for the loss of use of the car, or is the
compensation for use of and damage to the car merely to be credited against the usual fees? If
the latter, what is to stop the City, which impliedly already has the right to charge these fees
(because the fiscal justification behind them meets rational basis review), from charging even
more to hedge against possible takings claim liability?
297. Lior J. Strahilevitz, Note, When the Taking Itself is Just Compensation, 107 YALE L.J.
1975, 1979 (1998).
298. C. Wayne Owen, Jr., Note, Everyone Benefits, Everyone Pays: Does the Fifth Amendment
Mandate Compensation When Property is Damaged During the Course of Police Activities?, 9
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 277, 277 (2000) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960) (internal quotation marks omitted) and arguing that the Fifth Amendment requires com-
pensation for innocent third party landowners when police cause damage to property while exe-
cuting their official duties).
299. See generally Spencer M. Punnett II, Note, The "Takings" Clause and the Duty to Provide
Evidence: An Alternative Analysis of Emery v. State, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1094 (1985-1986) (argu-
ing that whether government must compensate for damage to property used as evidence in a
criminal proceeding should depend on the culpability of the plaintiff); see also Owen, supra note
298, at 300 (arguing that "[t]he clear mandate of the Just Compensation Clause is to provide
recompense for the innocent third party whose property has been damaged by government ac-
tion"). But see Strahilevitz, supra note 297, at 1977-78 (arguing that in the case of an innocent
owner of an apartment complex whose property is damaged during the arrest of a drug-dealing
tenant, the "positive spillover effects," the expulsion of a "nuisance tenant," for example, all lead
to the conclusion that "the taking itself [constitutes] just compensation") (internal quotation
marks omitted). These arguments derive from situations where property was actually damaged
or destroyed. While Lee's car was damaged when it was spray painted, the primary focus of this
Note is whether Lee should be compensated for the temporary loss of possession of his car, or
specifically, whether he should have to pay fees to regain possession of the car. For the purposes
of this Note, we assume that this would be a taking tantamount to damage or destruction. See
Lee, 330 F.3d at 475 (Wood, J., concurring) (explaining that "a claimant need only prove that
'property,' in the sense of 'the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to [a] physical
thing,' has been 'taken"').
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tigation) is noncompensable, surely requiring Lee to shoulder the bur-
den of the secondary costs of towing and storage (as opposed to just
allowing Lee to reclaim the car when the City was done with it) consti-
tutes a valid takings claim. Indeed, such "burden-bearing" analysis
would provide Lee with far more protection than the Fourth Amend-
ment might because the City could not fall back on the argument that
such fees were reasonable, as they may have been in Lee's case.300
This result is possible because the Takings Clause, like the Due Pro-
cess Clauses, does not boast an express standard by which to balance
interests. But this also means courts will be forced to ad lib when
confronted with cases where the constitutional provision is facially rel-
evant, but good judgment, or merely common sense, militate against
its application. In other words, because the Takings Clause has no
inherent standard by which courts can balance countervailing inter-
ests, courts' wariness of binding government in trivial takings claims
may preclude legitimate takings claims in the return of property con-
text. As two commentators have noted: "It can't be the case, can it,
that the government must provide market-rate compensation for
every service that it extracts from citizens, including the duty to pro-
vide evidence in court proceedings? '30 1
2. Bringing A Takings Claim Would Be an Uphill Battle
The Supreme Court, in fact, echoed this sentiment in Hurtado v.
United States,302 where it held that the detention of pretrial witnesses
in order to assure their testimony is not a compensable taking of those
witnesses' time and labor-and lower federal courts and state courts
with analogous takings provisions have expanded this holding to phys-
ical evidence. 30 3 And while, as Judge Wood notes, Hurtado "speaks
narrowly" of giving testimony and may not have been meant to extend
to temporary forfeitures of property,30 4 the actual language is not so
narrow:
But the Fifth Amendment does not require that the Government
pay for the performance of a public duty [if] it is already owed....
It is beyond dispute that there is in fact a public obligation to pro-
300. See supra notes 231-258 and accompanying text.
301. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Taking Notes: Subpoenas and Just Compensation, 66 U.
CH . L. REV. 1081, 1084 (1999) (offering this "powerful intuition" as one reason why the ques-
tion of whether the enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum calling for the production of evi-
dence is a taking that requires just compensation has attracted little interest).
302. 410 U.S. 578 (1973).
303. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 301, at 1083-84.
304. Lee, 330 F.3d at 476 (Wood, J., concurring).
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vide evidence . . . and that this obligation persists no matter how
financially burdensome it may be.30 5
Indeed, courts have cited the language in Hurtado in rejecting takings
claims where physical property was involved, refusing to make the dis-
tinction between the sacrifice of personal services and the taking of
personal property.30 6 This precedent establishes a high hurdle for
claimants relying on the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause to regulate
government conduct with respect to property needed as evidence. In
light of Hurtado, the Lee court would not have had to stray far to hold
Lee's "public duty" and "obligation to provide evidence" precluded
any grievance he may have had with the City's policy concerning auto-
mobiles needed as evidence in criminal proceedings.
Lee's best takings argument would be that the taking did not occur
until after the City no longer needed his car as evidence, but given the
Seventh Circuit's approach to the Fourth Amendment, this also would
be a tough sell. Why would the court recognize the transformation of
a noncompensable taking to a compensable taking when it summarily
dismissed the idea that a reasonable seizure could transform into an
unreasonable seizure? Is a "taking" less of a temporally limited act
than a "seizure"? 30 7 Moreover, the "obligation to provide evidence"
justification hardly disappears when government ceases to actually
need the property-the City need only point out that towing and stor-
age are necessary costs incurred during the criminal investigation.
Again, because courts will be hesitant to open the door to takings
challenges every time the government requires a citizen's help with a
criminal case-they will feel compelled to dismiss claims even in cases
where the burden placed on the citizen is clearly unjust. Without a
vehicle to balance an individual's interest in his private property
305. Hurtado, 410 U.S. at 588-89 (internal citations omitted).
306. See Emery v. State, 688 P.2d 72, 77-79 (Or. 1984) (holding that the dismantling of a
pickup truck necessary for a murder prosecution was not a compensable taking); see also Soucy
v. State, 506 A.2d 288, 293 (N.H. 1985) (requiring owner of a burned down apartment building to
preserve the damage as evidence in a criminal prosecution is not a compensable taking under the
New Hampshire constitution); Eggleston v. Pierce County, 64 P.3d 618, 626 (Wash. 2003) (hold-
ing search during murder prosecution and preservation order rendering plaintiff's home unin-
habitable was not a compensable taking under the Washington constitution).
307. In fact, Webster's New College Dictionary defines to "take" as follows: "[T]o get into
one's possession by force, skill, or artifice, esp.: to capture physically: SEIZE .... " WEBSTER'S II
NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1123 (1999). Moreover, the Supreme Court describes a taking as
the "deprivation" of an individual's property rights in "relation to a physical thing," United
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945); that is, "it deals with what lawyers
term the individual's 'interest' in the thing in question," id. at 378, which sounds like Place's
"meaningful interference with possessory interest" definition of seizure. See United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). Neither definition implies a temporal limitation, but the Seventh
Circuit had no trouble attaching one to the Fourth Amendment.
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against countervailing government's law enforcement interests, courts
will be wary of inviting the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause into re-
turn of property cases like Lee.
The bottom line is that while the Takings Clause could be the an-
swer for individuals whose property is seized and not properly re-
turned, relying on its applicability in the criminal context could be
risky. Given the inadequacy of the due process clauses in these cases,
precluding Fourth Amendment protection to citizen's suffering from
the unreasonable detention of their private property may create a
constitutional gap where important property rights are left exposed to
autocratic government interference.
VI. CONCLUSION
Most people have no qualms about allowing the government to
temporarily take and use their private property if it will help remove a
dangerous criminal from the streets. Most people, however, also have
the expectation that their property will be returned to them as soon as
it is no longer needed, and that any conditions on that return will be
reasonable. People expect this because they know that the Constitu-
tion places a very high value on the protection of private property. 30 8
The Seventh Circuit in Lee held that the Fourth Amendment is not
the source of this protection because seizure is limited temporally to
the moment property is physically taken. This narrow reading of the
Fourth Amendment does not comport with Supreme Court precedent
which defines seizure as a meaningful interference with a possessory
interest-suggesting that any interference, no matter when it occurs,
constitutes a seizure while the individual still has a legal interest in
that property. What is more, the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
standard, which seeks to balance law enforcement interests against an
individual's private property interests, is well equipped to govern re-
turn of property cases. This is in stark contrast to the practicality of
applying due process principles, which invariably will give deference
to government interests, in the return of property context.
Finally, while the Takings Clause may be an apt candidate to curb
government discretion and protect these important rights, reliance on
a takings claim in the criminal context is risky, especially in light of
Supreme Court precedent rejecting such claims where there is a duty
to provide evidence. If this route is closed, Lee's broad holding pre-
cluding Fourth Amendment protections to individuals whose property
has been lawfully taken but not properly returned means that a consti-
308. See Lee, 330 F.3d at 476-77 (Wood, J., concurring).
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tutional gap exists with respect to important property rights. It is pos-
sible that the Constitution is silent with respect to this interest-that
the Framer's meant only to require the government to act reasonably
when taking property, and left it free to be unreasonable regarding its
return. But this does not reflect the temperament of the Framers in
1787. As one commentator noted, James Madison believed an essen-
tial object of the law in a civilized society is the preservation of per-
sonal property rights: "A government 'which [even] indirectly violates
[individuals'] property in their actual possessions is not a pattern for
the Unites States."' 309 The best way to avoid this "pattern" in cases
like Lee's is to apply the Fourth Amendment.
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